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ABSTRACT

The Effectiveness and Adoption of Market-Based State Health Care Expansion
Programs
By
Nathan Myers
Dr. Chris Stream, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Public Administration
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Market-based state health expansion programs are alternatives to government
programs like Medicaid and SCHIP which also seek to expand access to health insurance
for uninsured populations. These programs either utilize the private health insurance
market or function according to market principles. The market-based policies at issue in
this research are state high-risk health insurance pools, limited benefit plans, group
purchasing arrangements, reinsurance programs, and Health Insurance Flexibility and
Accountability waivers. This research addresses two separate but related research
questions: 1) Do these market-based programs provide general economic and social
benefits for the citizens of a state? 2) What role does citizen ideology and partisanship
play in the adoption of market-based programs at the state level?
This research indicates that the implementation of market-based programs at the state
level, as measured by an additive index, do provide some general benefits to the people
of a state. Regression analyses with panel-corrected standard errors and a Prais-Winsten
transformation indicate that market-based programs help to reduce mortalities per capita
and emergency outpatients treated. There is also evidence that these market-based
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programs are successful in helping to increase the gross state product. Separate analyses
focused on the presence and expansiveness of high-risk pools indicate that these
programs individually also provide general benefits.
Looking at the second research question regarding the influence of ideology and
partisanship on the adoption of market-based programs, the results are mixed. The Cox
proportional regression analysis found that having a higher percentage of Democrats in
the state legislature contributes to the adoption of market-based health insurance
expansion programs, while a higher level of citizen liberalism reduces the probability of
market-based programs being adopted. This suggests that a more liberal citizen
population is more supportive of government-based programs, but Democratic legislators
will nevertheless support the adoption of market-based programs as they require the
expenditure of limited financial and political capital but still allow the Democrats to
claim credit for advancing access to health care. Anecdotal examples of this could be
seen in the 2009 debate over the Obama health care plan.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
While the issue of universal health care reform largely faded from the national
political agenda following the failure of the Clinton health reforms in the 1990’s, the
issue once again became prominent during the 2008 presidential election campaign.
Democratic Senator and presidential nominee Barack Obama proposed a comprehensive,
government-based program (Barack Obama campaign web site, 2008), while his
Republican rival, Senator John McCain, argued for a more market-based approach (John
McCain campaign web site, 2008). However, between the years of 1994 and 2008 the
issue of health care hardly remained static, especially at the sub-national level. During
this period, states took the lead in the area of health care reform, largely through
incremental programs targeted toward particular segments of the uninsured population
(Patel and Rushefsky, 1999). For states, the focus was on market-based programs which
included high-risk health insurance pools, reinsurance plans, limited benefit plans, group
purchasing arrangements, and Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability waivers
(State Coverage Initiatives, 2009). Of particular interest in this study are state high-risk
health insurance pools -- which are market-based, state-created non-profit organizations
principally created to provide insurance coverage to those deemed uninsurable by private
companies. This dissertation discusses two complementary but related studies involving
the effectiveness and adoption of market-based state health expansion programs, with
particular emphasis on state high-risk health insurance pools. The recent experience of
the State of Tennessee in trying to enact both government-based and market-based health
access expansion programs is a good illustration of these issues.
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State-based and Market-based Health Reform in Tennessee
While the Clinton administration’s attempt at enacting universal health care failed in
Congress, it did yield some new government-based and market-based programs. One
example was in the state of Tennessee, where the government-based TennCare program
was created in 1994. The governor at that time, Democrat Ned McWhirter, was seeking a
strategy to get Medicaid spending under control after the state experienced a $250 million
shortfall. Confronted with a difficult choice between a major tax increase or spending
cuts, McWhirter put forth the TennCare program. This program sought to cover hundreds
of thousands of uninsured Tennesseans, purportedly for the same cost as what the state
was already spending on Medicaid (Wright, 2001).
For a time, the TennCare program appeared to be succeeding in its goals. However,
the cost of the program grew, and by 2005, Tennessee’s Medicaid expenditures,
including TennCare, represented over 26% of the state’s spending, while at the same time
new enrollment in the TennCare Standard program was closed except for children under
19 (Bureau of TennCare, 2004-5). In 2002, these difficulties in the program led Phil
Bredesen, the newly elected Tennessee governor (About Phil, n.d.), to begin to pursue
strategies for reforming the program in order to save money and limit benefits. Bredesen
first promised to find a durable strategy for preserving TennCare, but eventually
presented, before a joint session of the Tennessee legislature, a market-based alternative
to the TennCare program called Cover Tennessee. The Cover Tennessee program is
actually composed of three different programs: CoverTN, CoverKids, and AccessTN.
The CoverTN program represents a cost-sharing program where employers, employees,
and the state each contribute to the purchasing of employee health insurance. The
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CoverKids program provides insurance to uninsured children in families of four making
up to $50,000 a year, although higher income families can buy into the program. The
third element of AccessTN is a high-risk pool, which provides health insurance at a
premium for those who have been denied coverage due to a preexisting condition
(Bredesen Unveils, March 27, 2006).
Cover Tennessee was enacted by the legislature in May 2006, with a vote of 78-19 in
the House, and 30-1 in the Senate (Seibert, May 18, 2006). A deal was made in
November 2006 to reserve 4,500 of 6,000 slots in the new AccessTN risk pool for
chronically ill people cut from the rolls of the TennCare program (Medical News Today,
November 21, 2006). Meanwhile, as of October 2007, TennCare was given permission
by federal authorities to continue operating in much a pared-down form for three years
(Chang, 2007).
In 2008, a year after the Cover Tennessee program began offering coverage, the
employer-provided coverage element, CoverTN, was found to be missing its enrollment
targets by about 20%. Some Tennessee legislators took the opportunity of this
announcement to attack the program, being particularly critical of the maximum $25,000
a year payout. Health care advocates also attacked the CoverTN program, calling it a
“defined benefit plan that has serious limits.” Meanwhile polling done by the National
Federation of Small Business found that 60% of small business supported it (Rodgers,
June 15, 2008). However, the long-term efficacy of the program has yet to be determined,
particularly in regard to general social and economic benefits. The example of
Tennessee’s experience with the TennCare and Cover Tennessee programs sets up the

3

two questions at the center of this dissertation, both of which are primarily applicable to
the market-based Cover Tennessee program.

Description of Research
This dissertation focuses on market-based health insurance programs. Market-based
health insurance programs are defined, for the purposes of this research, as programs
which seek to expand access to the uninsured by facilitating the ability of individuals to
obtain coverage on the private market or via a market-like model rather than through a
government-operated program. The market-based programs at issue in this dissertation
fall into five types: (1) state high-risk health insurance pools, (2) reinsurance programs,
(3) limited benefit plans, (4) group purchasing arrangements, and (5) Health Insurance
Flexibility and Accountability waivers.
It is important to note that market-based programs are not referring to efforts that are
completely separate from the government. A number of programs referred to as marketbased, including high-risk pools and HIFA waivers, are programs which were in some
way initiated by the government. All of the market-based programs addressed in this
study had to at least receive some form of approval from the state government before
implementation could take place. These programs are defined as market-based because
they function according to market principles (such as requiring clients to pay premiums
for coverage) or expand access to coverage by increasing access to the private market.
While the U.S. has considered implementing universal health care throughout its history,
the last twenty years have seen states taking the lead in the area of health care, largely
through targeted, incremental programs (Beamer, 2004; Leichter, 2004; Sparer, 2004).
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While these programs have been widely adopted throughout the U.S. states, they have not
been given the research attention accorded to larger-scale, federally-initiated programs
such as Medicaid and SCHIP.
The dissertation will look first at the effectiveness of market-based health expansion
programs. For the purposes of this study, effectiveness is defined as providing social and
economic benefits which extend beyond the client population being served to the general
population of the state. While previous studies have examined the effectiveness of statelevel programs in improving the status of the program’s client population (Laudicina,
1988; Currie and Gruber, 1996; Sloan and Conover, 1998; Chollet, 2002; Jacoby and
Schneider, 2003; Leichter, 2004; Mead, 2004) there has been only cursory research into
the societal impacts that these programs have for general state populations.
The critics of the Cover Tennessee program, even though the program was only
recently adopted, have already issued the standard critiques of a market-based program,
which are that it is too limited in its funding and enrollment to have any meaningful
benefit to the client population or the state has a whole. While previous research has
found that market-based programs like Cover Tennessee are limited in the extent to
which they can lower the percentage of uninsured in a state, some researchers have
argued that these programs can have developmental benefits for a state (Batistella and
Kuder, 1993, as cited in Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007). The first primary research question
at issue in this dissertation is:
1) To what extent do market-based health access expansion programs have general
economic and social benefits for the state as a whole?

5

The dissertation will next focus on the adoption of market-based health expansion
programs. Turning to the issue of policy adoption, there is a vast literature which has
found that policy is adopted at the state level due to various internal and external
influences (Dawson and Robinson, 1963; Dye, 1966; Cnuddle and McCrone, 1969;
Barrilleaux and Miller, 1988; Feiock and West, 1993; Grogan, 1994; Coleman, 1999;
Daley and Garand, 2005). Political influences, including legislative party control and
ideology, are frequently cited in the literature. Often the hypotheses surrounding these
influences are premised on a political party or ideological faction being supportive of a
type of policy for ideological reasons (Entman, 1983; Barrilleaux and Miller, 1988; Meier
and McFarlane, 1993; Grogan, 1994; Brown, 1995; Appelbaum, 2001; Shipan and
Volden, 2006; Weissert and Weissert, 2006). However, the market-based health
expansion programs addressed in this study can often defy traditional ideological labels,
as they seek to expand access to health insurance coverage (a liberal priority) through
largely market-based programs (a conservative preference). Therefore, these particular
programs offer a unique opportunity to reexamine traditional theories regarding
partisanship, ideology and policy adoption.
The example of Tennessee’s experience with TennCare and Cover Tennessee
raises this issue in regard to market-based health expansion programs. The conventional
wisdom in health policy research is that Democrats favor more government-oriented
health reforms, while Republicans champion reforms that are more market-oriented
(Weissert and Weissert, 2006). However, the previous example of Tennessee health care
reform notes that both the government-based TennCare program and the market-based
Cover Tennessee program were enacted during Democratic administrations. This
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suggests that the partisan orientations regarding health care reforms are not as rigid as
they are sometimes portrayed. The issue of partisan influence on the adoption of the
market-based health care expansion programs is at the center of the second primary
research question in this dissertation:
2) What relationship does the level of Democratic control of the legislature and
citizen liberalism have with the adoption of market-based health care access
expansion programs?

Outline of the Research
The dissertation will consist of five chapters. The first chapter provides background
on previous research conducted in the area of access to health insurance. One area of the
health policy literature which the research builds on highlights the widespread economic
and societal effects of the lack of health insurance. Previous research highlights the fact
that lacking access to health care does result in lower individual and societal economic
productivity, poorer health outcomes, greater expenses for government due to poorer
health, and negative effects on the health infrastructure (Davis, et al, 2007; Hadley, 2003;
Wolman and Miller, 2004). However, little research has focused on the effectiveness of
the programs designed to address these problems. This research seeks to fill that gap.
The second chapter focuses on this question of the effectiveness of state-level marketbased health expansion programs. The effectiveness of government programs has been a
prominently studied topic in health policy literature (Flynn, et al, 1997; Sloan and
Conover, 1998; Hall, 2000; Abbe, 2002; Chollet, 2002). However, the question of
effectiveness has largely been narrowly focused on the impact of the programs on the
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specific client population. While the literature makes a persuasive argument that
problems like uninsurance create difficulties that extend beyond the uninsured (Davis, et
al, 2007; National Academies, 2003; Wolman and Miller, 2004), previous studies have
not been particularly active in terms of examining the effect of health expansion
programs on these societal consequences.
To study the effects of the programs in this dissertation, five models are utilized using
different socioeconomic outcomes: state health spending, mortality, gross state product,
emergency outpatients, and expenditures per patient. The study finds that these marketbased programs are effective in helping to address the issues of reducing mortality per
capita and emergency outpatients treated, while helping to boost the economic
productivity of the state as measured by gross state product. The third chapter will
summarize the results of the effectiveness analyses in the second chapter, as well as
discussing their implications.
The fourth chapter examines how partisanship, ideology and other state-level social
and political influences affect whether or not a state adopts market-based health insurance
programs. This chapter will employ an event history model to look at the effect of
political, social, and need variables on the adoption of market-based state health
programs. The percentage of Democratic control of the state legislature was found to be
significantly and positively related to the adoption of market-based programs. The
adoption study finds that citizen ideology has a significant and negative relationship to
the adoption of market-based health insurance programs. These findings taken together
suggest that Democrats may pursue more pragmatic policy options in the area of health
care, as opposed to adhering to rigid liberal ideology. In the fifth and final chapter, the
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study explores how the complementary studies of the effectiveness and adoption of
market-based health insurance programs inform each other. The two studies suggest that
the market-based health insurance programs, taken as a whole, are effective in providing
relief to widespread economic and social problems, while interestingly these programs
seem to enjoy support from Democrats but not the liberal public. Considering these
results in light of events surrounding the 2009 health care reform debate at the state and
national level suggests that these market-based programs may deserve more attention
than they have received, and may garner that attention in light of recent policy shifts such
as Tennessee’s move from a government-based to a market-based system.

Limits of the Research
This study does face a number of limitations which should be acknowledged. First, the
data used in both the effectiveness and adoption studies are compiled from numerous
sources, which raise some issues of consistency across variables. However, all of the data
has been collected from reputable sources, such as the U.S. Census Bureau, the American
Hospital Association, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, which should help
minimize any complications.
Turning to the effectiveness model, an issue related to the data is the fact that some of
the dependent variables in regard to the effectiveness study are imperfect measures of the
phenomenon being studied. Most notably, the variable for the mortality per capita in the
state is an imperfect measure of the overall health of a state. However, it is preferable to
some composite measures of overall state health that incorporate a variety of factors and
are therefore likely to introduce a significant amount of endogeneity into the model.
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Another data issue is the fact that state level data is limited in regard to some of the
variables that are important for the study. For instance, reliable measures of state-level
uninsurance are only available reliably from the early 1990’s onward. This places
considerable limitations on the time frame that can be effectively studied in regard to our
research questions. However, having data from 1994 through 2003 for all fifty U.S. states
still provides a data set robust enough to test the hypotheses in question. There are also
methodological issues in regard to the use of a time series cross-sectional data as it relates
to the effectiveness study. Most notably, this type of analysis is prone to autocorrelation
and biased error terms (Beck and Katz, 1995). The time series model used in the
effectiveness study employs a Prais-Winsten transformation to address autocorrelation
and utilizes panel-corrected standard errors to address bias in the error terms.
Another issue, looking at the event history model, is that a number of cases are lost
from the model due to the nature of the Cox proportional hazard model. The model
measures adoption of market-based health programs, and as states cease adopting they
drop out of the model, resulting in many cases being lost. However, as the data set covers
the years 1989 through 2002, even with the lost cases the data set still seems robust
enough to test the hypotheses. An additional issue related to the adoption study, which
utilizes a Cox proportional hazard model, is that hazard models are only effective with a
limited number of covariates in the model. This was noted by Blossfeld, Hamerle, and
Mayer (1989), who wrote that the hazard model should not contain too many parameters
as this can result in a loss of estimate precision unless the sample size is quite large.
Therefore, in order to maintain parsimony, some potentially useful explanatory variables
could not be included in the model. However, the limited number of covariates does force
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one to carefully consider which covariates to utilize, so that the researcher assembles the
best model he or she can.
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND ON RESEARCH
Costs and Consequences of the Uninsured
Uninsurance is a serious and growing problem in the United States. A recent report
from the U.S. Census Bureau found that the percentage of Americans without health
insurance rose from 15.3 percent in 2005 to 15.8 percent in 2006. In terms of the overall
numbers, the uninsured population nationwide increased from 44.8 million to 47 million.
For those Americans with health insurance coverage, employment remains the primary
source of their insurance, unfortunately the percentage of people covered by
employment-based insurance decreased to 59.7 percent in 2006 from 60.2 percent in
2005. Many of those without insurance are children. The percentage of children under the
age of 18 who were uninsured increased from 10.9 percent in 2005 to 11.7 percent in
2006. For older Americans, the number of people covered by Medicaid was statistically
unchanged between 2005 and 2006 (DeNavas-Walt, et al, 2007).
The issue of uninsurance has remained on the national agenda because of the serious
economic and social consequences for the United States. Increases in the uninsured
contribute to costly reliance on emergency room care and hospital admissions for
preventable conditions. Uninsured people are more likely to undergo duplicate tests, as
well as experience delays and errors in test results (Davis, et al, 2007). While many
assume that poor individuals who cannot afford coverage can receive assistance through
Medicaid, it is important to note that 64% of uninsured, poor adults are ineligible for
Medicaid, primarily because childless adults are categorically excluded from Medicaid
(Dorn, 2008).
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Lost economic value due to uninsurance is estimated to be $65-$130 billion a year.
Impaired health due to lack of health insurance is linked to absenteeism and reduced
productivity in the workplace. The estimated value for an individual of improved health
due to expanding coverage is estimated to be $1645-$3280 annually (National
Academies, 2003). Among Americans aged 51 to 59, poor health has been linked to
decreasing income and wealth, along with forcing people into early retirement. A general
finding across studies is that poor health reduces annual earnings by 15 to 30 percent.
Those in poor health are also less likely to work at all compared to someone in excellent
health. Even those in poor health who were working made an hourly wage 23% lower
than those with better health. Depending on the measure of health used, the improvement
of an employee’s health to “good or excellent” from “poor to fair” could boost earnings
by 15-20 percent (Hadley, 2003). Mullahy and Sindelar (1993) found that people in good
health had earnings 37.7 percent higher than people with poor health conditions.
Lack of health care also takes an economic toll on individuals and families in regard to
how much they pay for health care. Uninsured families tend to defer preventative care
due to cost concerns, which can result in unsatisfactory health outcomes and more
expensive care. The uninsured tend to be charged more for hospital care than the insured
because there is no one to negotiate prices. Families with a member lacking health
insurance are more likely to have medical expenses in excess of 5-10 percent of their
income than those whose members are all insured (Hadley, 2003).
The responsibility for funding health care is divided among a number of levels of
government, and tends to be fragmented and ill-defined. The federal Emergency Medical
Treatment and Labor Act includes no provisions for paying for emergency room care
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aside from billing the patient. Emergency room care for the uninsured is largely
uncompensated, and results in financial burdens for hospitals. These pressures have
prompted hospital mergers, conversions (public to private, non-profit to for-profit), and
closures (Hadley, 2003). Such change can create improvements to health services at the
local level, but it can also have negative consequences to communities such as disruption
in services, loss of facilities and jobs, and a reduction in state and federal support. Urban
areas with substantial rates of uninsured people have fewer beds per capita, offer fewer
services for vulnerable populations, and are less likely to have units for specialized care.
Uninsurance can also have the effect of forcing health professionals to sacrifice
preventative care programs for programs to benefit the uninsured, decreasing the overall
level of community health (Hadley, 2003).
The cost of providing health care to the uninsured was estimated at $99 billion in
2001. Uninsured families paid $26 billion out of pocket, $38 billion was paid by public
and private insurance for care for those uninsured for part of the year, and the remaining
$35 billion went uncompensated. The uninsured also create a drag in the health care
system because they tend to be in poor condition when they enroll in Medicare, and thus
their costs are higher (Wolman and Miller, 2004).
The growing problem of uninsurance and the lack of success in addressing the
problem at the national level led the U.S. states to pursue different strategies to expand
coverage. A decrease in federal support and an increase in need have spurred states to
become innovators in the area of health care, making strides in areas like regulation,
rationing, and innovative/competitive strategies to cut health care costs (Patel and
Rushefsky, 1999). States have utilized increased discretion from the federal government
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to expand initiatives like the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) or
create new programs (Sparer, 2004). While the success of states in implementing reform
has been mixed (Sparer, 2004), by the time of the Clinton plan’s congressional demise
most state governments had enacted laws to increase portability and access to insurance
(Stream, 1999).

The Role of States in Health Care
State and local government activity in health care is not a new trend. States and local
governments have taken an active role in public health policy since the 1800’s. States’
initial involvement was primarily geared toward battling the problem of communicable
diseases and mental health problems. The twentieth century saw state and local
governments begin to deliver personal health services and license hospitals. In the
1960’s, the federal government began to provide support to states for institutions serving
the poor, particularly with the creation of the Medicaid program. Medicaid increased
revenue to public hospitals and local health departments. As this support was coming in,
states increased their role in the regulation and licensing of the health industry, and
became involved in hospital rate setting (Patel and Rushefsky, 1999).
Federal support for state health programs diminished in the 1980s, forcing states to
shoulder a heavier share of the burden, particularly with regard to the Medicaid program.
This decrease in federal support led to static Medicaid funding, while the population of
the poor increased. States were ultimately forced to make a tradeoff between cost
containment and access to health care. This devolution to the states forced states to
become innovators in health care. States are in a unique position to be health care
innovators, notably because of the wider latitude they have with which to experiment
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with policy (Patel and Rushefsky, 1999). This experimentation is useful because states
can enact policies which might not be acceptable in other states, such as employer
mandates (Weissert and Weissert, 2006).
However, in the 1980’s many policymakers at the federal level did not in fact see
states as credible health care leaders, as they were considered to be lacking the political
will to make tough decisions that might anger either payers or providers. Conventional
wisdom held that states lacked the fiscal capacity to pursue universal coverage, and any
truly meaningful reform would have to originate from Washington, DC. However, the
1990s saw a significant change in the political landscape, with Massachusetts enacting a
“play or pay” plan (wherein an employer will either provide coverage to employees or
pay a fee to the state), which preceded the current insurance mandate program. Oregon
rationed health procedures for a portion of the Medicaid population, and a number of
states pursuing universal coverage (Five States, 1994). With this change in the states
came greater discretion and latitude from the federal government. This discretion often
came in the form of waivers allowing states to forego certain federal requirements related
to intergovernmental programs like Medicaid. This change in policy is related to a
perceived increase in administrative capacity at the state level. For instance, governors
now employ larger and more professional staffs that can provide expertise in managing
new programs. States have also benefited from high revenues and savings from lower
utilization of social services. Many states recognized this opportunity and used the
greater resources to produce a variety of innovative health policies (Sparer, 2004).
One of the major initiatives to come out of the 1990s was the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP). This program provided states with federal matching funds
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to make it easier for them to expand health insurance coverage for uninsured children by
either building upon Medicaid or funding an alternative program. States were also
granted authority to provide services directly through expansions of local health
department clinics or federally qualified health centers. Additionally, states gained the
power to negotiate contracts with hospitals serving low-income families (Patel and
Rushefsky, 1999).
The results, however, of initiatives other than SCHIP have been varied. While the
goals of SCHIP were fairly ambitious, a number of the other reforms implemented by the
states in the 1990’s were modest in scope and impact. Additionally, SCHIP, along with
many other state health policies, were financed by the federal government and were thus
subject to regulation from Washington. This sort of intergovernmental policymaking
tends to encourage incremental policies, rather than sweeping reform (Sparer, 2004).
States themselves do face a number of obstacles to regulating insurance and expanding
access to the market, including the federal ERISA Act (which limits the states’ ability to
regulate self-insured employer coverage), difficulty in organizing small businesses, lack
of state financial resources, lack of support for government action to regulate health care,
and the political power held by big business. As a result states have sought approaches to
reform which are not dependent on significant state funding or strong action by the state
(Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007).
However, this is not to say that they are completely powerless to innovate. States do
have the means and the will to make positive change in the health care system. Further,
these policy innovations can be copied by other states and then diffused throughout the
country (Weissert and Weissert, 2006). In addition to government-based efforts such as
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SCHIP, a number of states have taken up reforms which seek to increase access to the
private insurance market, or at least enact programs which function according to market
principles. These approaches will be addressed next.

Market-based Approaches to Expanding Health Care
Barrilleaux and Brace (2007) define market-based health policies in the following
manner: “Market-based policies seek to coerce businesses to purchase insurance or, in the
case of risk pools, use state leverage to reduce insurance prices (but without imposing a
cost on insurers)” (Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007). For the purposes of this research,
market-based programs are defined more broadly as programs which seek to make
private insurance coverage more accessible to those who need it, or programs enacted by
the government which function according to market principles (i.e. clients still have to
pay for their coverage). It should be noted that the term market-based is not meant to
indicate that these programs are entirely divorced from government involvement. In fact,
in most states the programs addressed in this research were made possible, at least in part,
by government intervention in the market. Rather than indicating the lack of any
relationship with government, the term market-based is meant to denote that these
programs promote coverage expansion through the market, as opposed to a governmentoperated social welfare program such as Medicaid.
Barrilleaux and Brace (2007) note that the story of the American health care system is
one of incremental expansion, resulting in a “patchwork” system which, despite
numerous efforts at reform in the 20th and early 21st centuries, has left approximately 47
million uninsured. Previous research (Sparer 2003, as cited in Barrilleaux and Brace,
2007) found that the most successful health reforms involved both the federal and state
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governments (such as Medicaid and SCHIP) and that that state-level efforts, particularly
those which could be described as market-based, were unsuccessful. Unlike the statebased solutions, which assume inherent market failure in health insurance coverage,
market-based initiatives seek to make adjustments to the private health care market in
order to allow entry to those previously shut out. Advocates see this approach, which
depends on voluntary compliance on the part of private insurers, as more efficient, while
advocates for more state-based activity argue that such efforts are not substantial enough
to increase provision of coverage. Next we will more closely examine one of the marketbased programs noted by Barrilleaux and Brace (2007), the state high-risk health
insurance pool.

State High-Risk Health Insurance Pools
A key element to states expanding their provision of health care services is the
utilization of non-profit organizations. Kettl (1993) notes that state and local governments
employ an extensive network of nonprofit contractors in order to deliver many of the
social services that citizens demand. The vast majority of these contracts are going to
social services in such areas as hospital management and mental health. Many Medicaid
programs are also channeled through non-profits at the local level. Often, the federal
government has been a catalyst for this movement as they have provided grants to state
and local governments for programs with the idea that the money will be utilized through
non-profits, due to distrust of politicians at the lower levels (Kettl, 1993).
A survey conducted by the International City/County Management Association1 found
that local governments administering social services often employ a mixed model, where
1

ICMA, Service Delivery in the 90’s, as cited in Kettl, 2003.
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government employees directly oversee some programs and others are overseen by
outside contractors. State and local governments tend to function as holding companies
which provide outside organizations with the means to provide services (Kettl, 1993). In
addition to contracting out to existing non-profits for services, states have also taken the
step of creating their own non-profit entities to expand coverage and improve health care.
An example of this innovative phenomenon is state high-risk health insurance pools.
These pools, currently operational in 34 states, act as independent entities, governed
by a board of directors and administered by an insurance carrier in the state who offers
coverage to the uninsurable population.2 These pools were originally created with the
intent of providing coverage to those who could not receive private coverage due to a
preexisting condition. However, this limited scope of mission has been expanded through
the years by federal legislation, including the Health Insurance Portability and
Accessibility Act and the Trade Adjustment Act (Laudicina, 1988). Today, risk pool
associations must create a comprehensive insurance policy that meets the needs of the
medically uninsurable and other groups, while at the same time adhering to guidelines on
premiums, benefits, and deductibles (Frakt, et al, 2004/2005).
The first pools were established in Connecticut and Minnesota in 1976 (Frakt, et al,
2004/2005). Risk pools allow uninsurable people to obtain coverage, as well as acting as
a fallback to others who encounter problems with the insurance industry, such as
unreasonably high premiums (Stearns et al, 1997). The target population for these
programs tends to be smaller, as the percentage of a state’s population in the individually

2

Individuals are classified as uninsurable by health insurance companies because their risk premiums are
not large enough to compensate an insurer for providing coverage (Morrissey, 2008).
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insured market3 is less than 2% in all states except Minnesota, Nebraska, and Oregon
(Achman and Chollet, 2001). Chollet (2002) found that enrollment in risk pools was
below 1 percent of the individually insured market. Some states only cover individuals,
while others provide coverage to families. For example, Minnesota’s plan only covers
individuals, while the plan in Connecticut covers spouses, unmarried children under the
age of 19, and other dependents who are unmarried and under 19 (Minnesota
Comprehensive Health Association, 2006; Health Reinsurance Association, 2005).
Funding sources for high-risk pools include client premiums, assessments on private
insurers, and general state revenue (Frakt, et al, 2004/2005). The federal ERISA law
prevents pools from making any assessments on self-insured employer plans,4 which can
account for fifty percent of the market in some states (Abbe, October 2002). States put
caps on out-of-pocket patient expenditures anywhere from $2,000 to $20,000. Waiting
periods until benefits will be conferred can range from six months to one year, and
lifetime benefits range from $350,000 (Wyoming) to $2.8 million (Minnesota) (Achman
and Chollet, 2001). Some states put a cap on annual benefits, with three states having
benefits amounting to less than $200,000 a year (Chollet, 2002).

The Need for High-Risk Pools
Much of the need for these high-risk health insurance pools stems from the fact that
the rising costs of health care have caused insurance companies to become more stringent
in their underwriting standards, making it difficult for individuals to find health insurance

3

The individual insurance market is composed of those individuals who purchase health insurance
coverage privately, rather than receiving coverage under an employer plan.
4
Under a self-insured plan, businesses put money into a fund from which they pay employee medical
claims rather than paying premiums to an insurance company. The business then assumes all of the risk for
insurance coverage (Park, 2000).
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(Perry, 2002). Such stringent standards lead to people being deemed “medically
uninsurable,” i.e. having a serious medical condition which is likely to require extensive
medical care (Laudicina, 1988). A person may also be considered medically uninsurable
if they pay significantly higher premiums due to a medical condition, or if the coverage
comes with an elimination rider5 (State High-Risk Health Insurance Pools, 2005). A 1994
study found that 0.7 percent of the American population (approximately 2 million people)
were deemed medically uninsurable by insurance companies (NCPA, 1994). Specific
conditions rendering one uninsurable may include: aneurysm, diabetes, AIDS,
rheumatoid arthritis, dialysis, spinal disorders, paralysis, psychosis, and hemophilia
(AccessWV, 2006). Due to the fact that these high-risk pools behave similarly to private
insurance companies, they are best characterized as a market-based program. These
programs function based on a market model in that they charge premiums for their
coverage, and utilize a network of private sector and non-profit care providers and
administrative resources in their operation (Comprehensive Health Insurance, 2007). In
the next section, this study will examine other market-based programs included in this
study.

Specific Insurance Expansion Strategies
A number of other market-based strategies have been employed at the state level to
address the problem of uninsurance, in addition to the high-risk pools noted above. States
are in a unique position to be health care innovators, notably because of the wider latitude
they have in which to experiment with policy (Patel and Rushefsky, 1999). Of particular

5

An elimination rider allows insurance companies to specifically exclude a particular condition, body part,
or system of the body from coverage under an insurance plan (Consumer Guide, 2009).
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interest for the purposes of this study is the role of state high-risk health insurance pools.
However, a number of other expansion strategies are addressed in the dissertation as well.
Another expansion strategy that will be addressed in this study is waivers granted by the
federal government to allow states to expand their Medicaid populations. About 98,000
people have gained new coverage through waivers under the Health Insurance Flexibility
and Accountability Act of 2001. Most states have chosen to use HIFA waivers to expand
Medicaid above the minimum federal requirements (State Coverage Initiatives, 2007).
The waivers also contain elements which seek to encourage people to pursue coverage in
the private market. Owcharenko (2002) cites the guidelines provided by the Department
of Health and Human Services for implementing the HIFA waivers:
The Administration puts a particular emphasis on broad statewide approaches that
maximize private health insurance coverage options and target Medicaid and
SCHIP resources to populations with income below 200 percent of the Federal
poverty level.
A number of states, including Illinois, Idaho, New Mexico, and Oregon have
encouraged the purchase of private health insurance by creating or expanding premium
assistance programs to try to give the private market a more active role in expanding
coverage to the uninsured (Coughlin, et al, 2006). Therefore, while this effort is classified
as a market-based approach for the purposes of this research, it could also be
characterized as mixed.
Other important strategies a state might rely on would be initiatives such as
reinsurance programs, a group purchasing arrangements, and limited benefit plans. A
reinsurance program can be used to reduce premiums by shifting some of the expense for
high-cost enrollees to a third party (possibly the state). This is designed to lead to lower
premiums by reducing incentives for carriers to hold excess reserves. Group purchasing
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arrangements are public or private efforts to allow more than one small or large employer
and/or individuals to pool together to collectively purchase health insurance. One other
type of program employed to address the uninsurance problem is limited-benefit plans.
Limited-benefit plans are designed to decrease premiums by limiting the number of
covered services in comprehensive health benefit plans (State Coverage Initiatives 2006).
One aspect all of these coverage expansion strategies have in common is that they
represent to varying degrees government’s attempt to facilitate improving health
coverage by utilizing tools available in the private market. The next chapter will examine
the study of the effectiveness of these market-based health insurance programs.
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CHAPTER 2
EFFECTIVENESS OF MARKET-BASED STATE
HEALTH EXPANSION PROGRAMS
Introduction
This study assesses the general societal and economic effects of market-based state
efforts. This study hypothesizes that the implementation of these programs leads to lower
state health spending, better overall citizen health, greater economic productivity, and a
more sustainable health care system. The findings in this dissertation lend credence to the
notion that market-based programs designed to expand health care access to the
uninsured will yield tangible economic and social benefits for the state as a whole.
The previous example of the TennCare/Cover Tennessee experience raises this
question of whether or not market-based state health expansion programs provide general
benefits to the state as a whole. TennCare was created in the wake of the failure of the
Clinton health plan in an attempt to provide universal health care within the state of
Tennessee, however the program proved financially unsustainable in its original form.
Governor Phil Bredesen, rather than using his political capital to preserve the TennCare
program, chose to create a narrower, market-based program known as Cover Tennessee.
Not long after its implementation, the Cover Tennessee program came under criticism for
not meeting its enrollment targets. This highlights the idea (noted in the previous chapter)
that the success of these market-based programs is measured narrowly in terms of
enrollment and decrease in the uninsured population. However, recent research in the
area of health policy (Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007; Battistella and Kuder, 1993) suggest
that the effect of these programs should be looked at in a broader sense, as they may have
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developmental impacts for a state not accounted for in the narrower measures of
enrollment and percentage of uninsured.
This chapter tests the idea that market-based health insurance expansion programs can
provide general benefits for the people of a state. It begins with background on the
economic and health consequences of uninsurance, as well as previous research on
market-based health expansion programs. The hypotheses for the effects of the marketbased health insurance expansion programs on the dependent variables are presented.
Following the presentation of hypotheses, there is a discussion of the control variables
used in the analysis, as well as the research methodology used in the study. The chapter
concludes with the results of the analysis of the effects of the market-based programs on
the dependent variables.

Background on the Economic and Health Consequences of Uninsurance
In order to assess the effectiveness of market-based health expansion programs in
alleviating economic and societal ills created by uninsurance, we must first examine what
effects the lack of insurance has on government health spending, the overall health of a
state’s population, a state’s overall economic strength, and the sustainability of the state’s
medical infrastructure. Government efforts to expand health insurance coverage are
promoted on a number of grounds. One is the humanitarian argument that in a nation as
wealthy as the United States all citizens should have access to basic health care (Health
Care Reform, 2009). However, a more tangible argument that may work in favor of
expansion advocates may be that expanding coverage would provide benefits to society
as a whole. These benefits could be translated into dollar amounts in the form of
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economic gains and better health outcomes. In the following sections, this dissertation
reviews the economic ills created when individuals do not have health insurance, which
include increases in government health spending, reductions in health outcomes,
decreases in economic productivity, and stress on the medical infrastructure.

Effect of Uninsurance on Government Health Spending
The lack of insurance has several effects on government health spending. The
responsibility for health care spending is shared by numerous levels of government, a
system which is best characterized as fragmented and ill-defined. The literature on
uninsurance suggests that lack of health insurance coverage imposes long term costs on
the state and federal government, as uninsured people are likely to be in worse physical
condition when they reach 65 and enroll in Medicare, thus their cost to Medicare is
higher (Wolman and Miller, 2004). Heffler, et al. (2005) found that health care costs are
shifting significantly from the private to the public sector, and by 2014 total (both
governmental and non-governmental) health spending will represent 18.7 percent of the
gross domestic product (GDP), up from 15.3 percent in 2003. Additionally, state and
local governments make payments to hospitals through tax appropriations which the
Medicare Payment Advisory Committee considers reimbursement for treatment of
uninsured patients. It is estimated that state and local governments spent $3.1 billion
dollars in tax appropriations in 2001 to reimburse hospitals for the uncompensated care of
uninsured patients. State and local governments also bear a financial burden from the
uncompensated care of the uninsured through funding of indigent care programs (Hadley
and Holahan 2003). These studies indicate that it is essential that government implement
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strategies to help contain the growing cost of health care. One method of doing this is to
expand coverage to the uninsured to reduce instances of uncompensated emergency care.
Some advocates argue for expanding coverage through a government program, while
others argue for market-based programs that expand access to coverage in the private
market.

Effect of Uninsurance on Health Outcomes
Lack of health insurance also has significant effects on health outcomes. Health
outcomes are a change in the health status of an individual, group or population which is
attributable to a planned intervention or series of interventions, regardless of whether
such an intervention was intended to change health status (WHO, 1998). In regard to
health outcomes for a state, people who are uninsured for a full year receive
approximately 55% of the medical care of those who did have coverage, even with
uncompensated care taken into account. Specifically, uninsured people receive less
preventative care, are diagnosed with more advanced diseases, and once diagnosed do not
receive adequate care and have higher mortality rates (Hadley and Holahan, 2004).
Looking at health outcomes as they relate to infant mortality (a common measure of
health outcomes), Currie and Gruber (1996) found that a 15.1 percentage increase in
children eligible for Medicaid between 1984 and 1992 is estimated to have decreased
child mortality by 5.1 percent. Levy and Meltzer (2001) found consistent evidence
through quasi-experimental studies that health insurance improves health, although the
effect is considerably more pronounced for lower-income people than higher income
individuals. Dorn (2008) estimated that 137,000 adults between the ages of 25-64 died
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due to lack of insurance between 2000 and 2006. In the same article, Dorn noted that
providing all uninsured adults between 55 and 64 years of age with health insurance
would have lowered mortality in that population by 27 percent (Dorn, 2008). He
concludes that in excess of 13,000 people in the 55-64 year old demographic die as a
result of being uninsured, “plac[ing] uninsurance third on a list of leading causes of death
for this age group, below only heart disease and cancer” (McWilliams, et al., 2004 as
cited in Dorn, 2008).
The negative health outcomes created by the lack of health insurance presents
economic and social challenges for the U.S. states. The economic challenges will be
addressed in the next section. In regard to the social challenges, the health difficulties
created by lack of insurance, particularly premature deaths, have detrimental effects to
families and communities which are difficult to quantify. However, the number of deaths
themselves provides some hard data to illustrate the humanitarian toll taken by the
uninsured problem. Some health expansion advocates argue for the use of market-based
health insurance programs, which could serve to increase insurance coverage but also
provide an economic development benefit.

Effects of Uninsurance on a State’s Economy
Several studies have examined the economic impacts of the lack of health insurance
on a state’s economy. One obvious argument demonstrated in the literature is that
impaired health is related to absenteeism at work and reduced job productivity.
According to one estimate, almost one-fifth of the working age population lacks health
coverage (National Academies 2003). Updating previous estimates of lost economic
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productivity due to uninsurance, Hadley and Holahan (2004) found that dollars lost
nationally as a result of uninsurance amounts to approximately $103 billion annually,
substantially more than the $48 billion which government would need to spend to provide
coverage. This additional $48 billion government spending would go toward Medicare,
Medicaid, and tax subsidies for private insurance, which would constitute less than 3% of
total personal health care spending in the U.S., and would only increase the share of GDP
going to health care costs by 0.4% (Hadley and Holahan, 2004).
Studies have also found that poor health reduces annual personal earnings by 15 to 30
percent (Hadley, 2003). Mullahy and Sindelar (1993) found that individuals in good
health had earnings 37.7 percent higher than people with poor health conditions. Those in
poor health were also less than half as likely to work compared to someone in excellent
health, and even if they were working their hourly wage was 23 percent lower.
Depending on the measure of health used, improving a person’s health status from “poor
or fair” to “good or excellent” or reducing the prevalence of a particular condition could
increase personal annual earnings by 15-20 percent. In addition to finding a direct link
between poor health and reduced personal income and wealth among Americans aged 51
to 59, it has also been cited as the primary issue leading people to leave the work force
prematurely (Hadley, 2003).
Another factor influencing reduced productivity (and hence, a negative impact on a
state’s economy) is that, particularly in recent years, increases in health care costs have
had a significant impact on employers and their employees. Increased health costs have
traditionally been passed on to insurance companies who then pass the costs on to
employers who provide health insurance for their employees. Employers, often due to

30

mandates that they provide health insurance for their workers, are left with difficult
tradeoffs: increase health benefits which will then need to be offset by reduced wages or
non-wage fringe benefits or pass the increased costs on to employees. This tradeoff will
determine the ultimate impact on employment (Flynn, Wade, and Holahan 1997). The
employment effects of the cost of health care would be expected to affect economic
productivity in a state. Some researchers have argued that market-based programs can
have positive developmental effects, partially through its benefits to businesses
(Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007).

Effects of Uninsurance on the Medical Infrastructure of a State
In regard to the effects on hospitals and health care costs, uninsured families tend to
use fewer preventative health services and defer care due to cost concerns. Forgoing
preventative care leads to more costly care later on and less satisfactory outcomes.
Hospitals tend to charge uninsured people higher prices than the insured because there is
no one to negotiate prices. Families with an uninsured member who suffers an injury or
illness are more likely to have medical expenses exceed 5 to 10 percent of their income
than insured families. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, which requires
emergency rooms to provide medical screening and, if necessary, treatment, makes no
provision for payment other than billing the patient. Uncompensated hospital services go
largely unpaid and create financial burdens for hospitals (Wolman and Miller 2004).
Financial pressures, from uncompensated care and other causes, have prompted
hospital mergers, conversions from public to private ownership or from private non-profit
to for-profit status, and closures. Such changes can improve health services locally, but
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can also cause disruptions, loss of facilities and jobs, and a loss of public dollars flowing
to the community. Urban areas with relatively high uninsured rates have fewer beds per
capita, offer fewer services for vulnerable populations, and are less likely to have
specialized care units. Preventative care programs may be reduced to compensate for
increased need to care for uninsured residents, which may decrease the overall health of
the community (Wolman and Miller, 2004).

Previous Research on the Effectiveness of Market-Based Health Expansion Programs
While the literature above illustrates that considerable attention has been given to the
various consequences of uninsurance, much of the research regarding the effectiveness of
market-based health expansion programs has been quite narrow in focus. In this section,
the dissertation will discuss previous research into and evaluations of market-based
health insurance expansion programs. Recall that for the purposes of this research
market-based health expansion programs refer to state high-risk health insurance pools,
limited benefit plans, group purchasing arrangements, reinsurance programs, and Health
Insurance Flexibility and Accountability waivers. A characteristic which is common
across these evaluations is that they are focused on rather narrow program outputs rather
than outcomes. As will be discussed later, some recent research has addressed the general
developmental effects of these programs.
Previous research on state high-risk health insurance pools indicates that evaluations
of these programs have focused on the level of enrollment and the effect on a state’s level
of uninsured. The amount of time people spend in a risk pool varies widely (Stearns and
Mroz, 1995). The creation of new pools increased enrollment to 190,361 as of the end of
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2006 (Comprehensive Health Insurance, 2007). The percentage of the uninsurable
actually served by risk pools varies from state to state. In 2000, Minnesota’s pool covered
8% of the uninsurable, while Connecticut’s covered 54% of the uninsurable (Frakt, Pizer,
and Wrobel, 2002). The figures are considerably different if one looks at what percentage
of the state’s uninsured population is covered by the pools. As of the end of 2006,
Minnesota’s pool covered approximately 7.2% of a state’s uninsured population, while
Connecticut covered only about 0.64% of the state’s uninsured (Comprehensive Health
Insurance, 2007). While these past evaluations provide useful information regarding
additional coverage created by the high-risk pools, they do not provide any sense of the
general social and economic benefits created by these pools.
Evaluations of other market-based programs have been similarly narrow in terms of
their focus on enrollment and effects on the uninsured population. An evaluation of
reinsurance programs in three U.S. states focused on “how much benefit it achieve[d]
within its target population and at what cost,” as well as the degree to which the programs
created market stability and segmented different populations within the insurance market
(Bovbjerg, et al, 2008). Friedenzohn (2004) conducted an evaluation of limited-benefit
plans which focused heavily on difficulties in achieving significant program enrollments.
The author did conclude her study by noting that a full examination of the limited benefit
plans would need to consider additional outcomes such as crowd-out, adverse selection,
and effects on safety-net providers (Friendenzohn, 2004). An examination of Health
Insurance Flexibility and Accountability waivers provided to the State Coverage
Initiatives National Meeting reported that “HIFA has expanded coverage, though perhaps
not to the degree originally anticipated because of budget constraints” (Sachs 2006, p. 9).
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This finding was supported by a study conducted by Coughlin, et al (2006), which found
that the ten HIFA demonstrations in place by the end of 2005 had expanded coverage to
300,000 people, however it goes on to note that an obstacle to these programs’
implementation and effectiveness has been budget constraints (Coughlin, et al, 2006).
Research focused on a variety of market-based health expansion strategies found that
these policies were successful in one respect (promoting the development of new
insurance markets), but less successful in terms of actually decreasing the percentage of
uninsured (Hall 2000, as cited Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007). Market-based expansion
efforts focused on increasing employer offerings of insurance were successful in
increasing the number of those offerings, but due to high costs to employees not many
workers availed themselves of such offerings (Sloan and Conover, 1998; Jensen and
Morrissey, 1999 as cited in Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007).
This research suggests that the previous evaluations of market-based health insurance
programs are in fact too narrowly tailored, and should further explore the general
economic, social, and health effects of these programs. Weissert and Weissert (2006)
note that government engages in or promotes a number of practices related to health care
as they have implications for society as a whole. These include vaccinations and
sanitation laws, as the susceptibility to and spread of infectious diseases can have effects
on a significant portion of a state’s population. There is also the problem of “free riders,”
where healthy people decline coverage, depending on emergency rooms for treatment in
the event of a catastrophic condition (Weissert and Weissert, 2006). This study analyzes
the effects of market-based health insurance programs on selected economic, social, and
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health indicators which apply to a state’s population as a whole. The results of the study
indicate that these programs do have effects in all three areas.

Conceptual Framework/Hypotheses/Data
This study expands on the previous research regarding the effectiveness of marketbased health expansion programs on improving social and economic conditions. In this
section, the hypotheses to be examined are presented. The study utilizes a pooled crosssectional time series regression model with adjustments to account for the effects of
heteroskedasticity in the model. The study examines the effects of these market-based
state health expansion programs in 50 U.S. states for the years 1994-2003, for an N of
500. These years were selected for analysis as this period of time was a particularly active
one for the enactment of state-level health programs. The cumulative effects of marketbased health insurance programs on selected economic, social, and health indicators at
the state level are analyzed using cross-sectional time series regression. This is done
using an additive index of how many market-based health expansion programs have been
implemented in the state. The results indicate that greater adoption of these market-based
has positive effects on mortality per capita, the gross state product, and emergency
outpatients treated.
In order to test the effectiveness of market based health programs, this study employs
five different models in the analysis, which look at the effect of the programs on state
health care spending, the state’s economy, overall state health levels and the health care
system in the state.
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Independent Variable of Interest
The primary independent variable of interest in this study is an index of market-based
health expansion programs. This index indicates the degree to which states have
implemented the five market-based health expansion programs of interest in the analysis:
high-risk pools, limited benefit plans, reinsurance programs, group purchasing
arrangements, and Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability waivers. The index
measures the presence of the programs on a 0-5 index, 0 if a state has implemented none
of the programs and 5 if a program has implemented all of the possible programs.
Information regarding the adoption of these programs in the states was reported by the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s web site, State Coverage Initiatives.
This variable allows us to capture an overall measure of state effort to expand access
to coverage to the uninsured through market-based programs. As these programs do
utilize different mechanisms to expand coverage to different populations within a state, to
truly gauge their impact, both in regards to their target populations or the general public,
would be difficult. However, this study is less interested in the specific ways in which
these programs expand coverage and their individual success than a state’s overall
willingness to utilize multiple market-based strategies to address the problem of
uninsurance and whether or not this policy effort on the part of the state translates into
tangible benefits for the state in terms of lower state spending on health, better overall
health outcomes, higher gross state product, and stronger medical infrastructure.

Hypotheses Regarding Independent Variable of Interest
The first model in this analysis looks at the effect of the presence of market-based
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state health programs on the percentage of state expenditures devoted to health care. The
dependent variable for state health spending is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau
Statistical Abstract. A significant portion of these expenditures represent state
government reimbursements to hospitals for uncompensated care provided by hospitals.
The hypothesis in regard to this dependent variable is that the presence of the marketbased state health programs will reduce the percentage of state health spending as the
programs do not represent significant additional spending for the state, but are able to
reduce the amount of uninsured people utilizing uncompensated care. This reduction of
uncompensated care will therefore reduce the need for the state to reimburse hospitals for
that care, and fewer uninsured people will translate into lower levels of state spending in
other health-related areas. However, it should be noted that most of the market-based
programs addressed in this study do not serve individuals who might benefit from social
welfare programs like Medicaid, which is the single-largest item in many state budgets
(Feldstein, 2007). This study investigates whether market-based programs do have a
beneficial relationship with state spending on health care. Formally stated, the first
hypothesis is that a greater presence of market-based state health expansion programs
will have a negative relationship to state spending on health care.
H1: A greater presence of market-based state health expansion programs will have a
negative relationship to state spending on health care.
The second model in this study examines the effect of market-based health programs
on the overall health of a state’s citizenry. The variable for overall health used in the
analysis is the state mortality rate per 100,000 as reported in the U.S. Census Bureau
Statistical Abstract. While this represents a rather gross measure of overall state health,
this study contends that healthier populations (i.e. populations with more ready access to
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health care) will exhibit lower mortality rates, which is supported by previous research
examining the relationship between self-evaluations of health and mortality (Lawrence
and Assmann, 1997). It should be noted that measures of mortality due to more specific
conditions were utilized in previous versions of the model, with similar results. The
primary hypothesis in regard to this dependent variable is that the presence of marketbased health programs will serve to lower state mortality rates through greater access to
preventative health care, particularly for traditionally underserved populations.
Hypothesis 2 is formally stated as a greater presence of market-based state health
expansion programs will have a negative relationship to a state’s mortality per capita.
H2: A greater presence of market-based state health expansion programs will have a
negative relationship to a state’s mortality per capita.
The third model examines the effect of the presence of the market-based state health
programs, controlling for other economic and social factors, on the wealth of a state as
measured by the gross state product per capita (as reported in the U.S. Census Bureau
Statistical Abstract). The primary hypothesis of the model is that the presence of marketbased state health programs will increase the overall wealth of a state by increasing the
productivity of the state’s workforce through better health. Hypothesis 3 is formally
stated as a greater presence of market-based health expansion programs will have a
positive relationship to gross state product.
H3: A greater presence of market-based health expansion programs will have a positive
relationship with gross state product.
The fourth model in the analysis investigates the effect of the presence of marketbased state health programs on the per capita level of emergency outpatients treated. The
dependent variable for emergency outpatients per 1,000 is reported in the American
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Hospital Association publication, Hospital Statistics. The literature on uninsurance in the
United States notes that one negative outcome of people in the United States being
uninsured is that uninsured people frequently delay seeking medical care for serious
health conditions until the matter becomes critical and they must seek care for the
condition in a hospital emergency room. Data released by the Department of Health and
Human Services indicated that one-fifth of the 120 emergency room visits in 2006
involved uninsured people (AHRQ, 2009). This can place significant strain on hospitals,
both financially and in terms of being able to treat patients in a timely manner. The
hypothesis in regard to this dependent variable is that the greater presence of marketbased state health programs will reduce the number of emergency outpatients treated in
hospitals by allowing people to seek preventative care, thus reducing instances of people
delaying care to the point where it becomes an emergency situation. Hypothesis 4 is
formally stated as a greater presence of market-based state health expansion programs
will have a negative relationship to emergency outpatients treated.
H4: A greater presence of market-based state health expansion programs will have a
negative relationship to emergency outpatients treated.
The fifth and final model in this analysis looking at the effectiveness of market-based
state health programs examines the relationship between the programs and the hospital
expenditures per patient. The data for expenditures per patient is reported in the
American Hospital Association’s Hospital Statistics. The literature suggests that lack of
health insurance can increase the level of expenditures per patient due to people delaying
care until more expensive care is necessary (Schwartz, 2007). The hypothesis regarding
this dependent variable is that expanding access to care through market-based state health
programs will have a negative relationship to expenditures per patient, as these programs
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will increase access to health care for these traditionally underserved populations and will
reduce instances of people delaying care until their condition becomes catastrophic. It
should be noted that the literature indicates numerous factors internal to hospitals which
can serve to increase incidents of adverse events which can in turn drive up patient costs
per day, including “poor quality care, understaffing, and lack of access to skilled care”
(Forrest, et al, 2002, p. 24). Garson and Engelhard (2008) also cite evidence that
preventative medicine does not actually reduce costs. Despite the conflicting evidence,
the hypothesis as formally stated is a greater presence of market-based state health
expansion programs will have a negative relationship on expenditures per patient.
H5: A greater presence of market-based state health expansion programs will have a
negative relationship on expenditures per patient.
The chart below summarizes the hypotheses for the models included in this study:

Table 3-1: Relationships between Market-based Health Expansion Index
and Dependent Variables
Market-based
Health Index

State Spending

-

Mortality Per Capita

-

Gross State Product

+

Emergency
Outpatients
Expenditures per
Patient

-

Control Variables
It should be noted that the same control variables are utilized across the five models
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in this study investigating the relationship between market-based health programs and
dependent variables. The logic of utilizing the same control variables across models is not
that these control variables directly explain variation in the dependent variables, but that
these variables affect the relationship between market-based programs and the dependent
variables in very particular ways across the models. With this in mind, the control
variables can be divided into three categories: Category 1 is control variables that also
expand access to insurance in lieu of market-based programs; Category 2 is control
variables which hinder access to market-based programs, and Category 3 is control
variables which stand to facilitate the creation of general societal and economic benefits
through the provision of health care and better implementation of the market-based
programs.

Control Variables Which Expand Access to Insurance
In addition to the index of market-based health expansion efforts, the model also seeks
to account for effects of government-based efforts to decrease the percentage of
uninsured in a state. This is done using independent variables which control for the
presence of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program and the use of Medicaid 1115
waivers. These two programs account for the two most significant government initiatives
to expand access to health insurance implemented at the state level during the period of
study. These variables are based on information regarding the implementation of these
programs taken from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s web site State Coverage
Initiatives. Previous research by Bernick and Myers (2008) found that, over time, the
SCHIP program did contribute to lower levels of uninsurance in the state. Healthy policy
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analysts, such as Weissert and Weissert (2006), note that the 1115 waivers have been
used to expand coverage for long term care, home health care, mental health care, the
poor, and adults between the ages of 19 and 64. However, limited attention has been
given to the relationship between the waivers and the level of uninsurance in the state. In
their study, Bernick and Myers (2008) did not find a statistically significant relationship
between the Medicaid waivers and the level of uninsured in the state. Nevertheless, due
to their widespread implementation it is expected that the 1115 waivers would be
associated with lower levels of uninsurance.
A measure of the percentage of union membership in a state as reported by the U.S.
Census Bureau Statistical Abstract is also included in the models. This is important to
take into account, as unions have historically been a dependable source of health
insurance benefits, and thus the higher the level of unionization in a state the more likely
a higher percentage of a state’s population would be expected to have access to health
insurance benefits. Unionization has also proven to be a significant variable in previous
models of economic development (Brace, 1993). Morrissey (2008) notes that organized
labor spurred the proliferation of health coverage in the 20th century, and Feldstein(2007)
notes that many large unions provide generous health benefits to their members.

Control Variables Which Serve to Limit Effectiveness of Market-based Programs
Another set of control variables included in the effectiveness models focus on forces
which could serve to limit the effectiveness of market-based programs. One measure is
the percentage of uninsured individuals residing in a state, as reported in the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Statistical Abstract. While this study is examining the effect of market-based
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Table 3-2: Hypothesized Relationships Between Health Expansion Control Variables
and Dependent Variables1
SCHIP
Medicaid 1115
Unionization

State Spending

-

-

-

Mortality Per
Capita
Gross State
Product
Emergency
Outpatients
Expenditures
per Patient

-

-

-

+

+

+

-

-

-

-

-

-

health expansion efforts on indicators other than the uninsurance rate, the level of need in
a state could theoretically affect the ability of these market-based initiatives to have any
meaningful effect on the dependent variables. For example, if a state has an exceptionally
high uninsurance rate which is contributing to a higher rate of mortality in the state,
market-based programs would need to be that much more effective in order to overcome
the uninsurance problem and improve mortality levels. Previously cited literature laid out
the very serious consequences of being uninsured (DeNavas-Walt, et al, 2007; Davis, et
al, 2007; National Academies, 2003; Hadley, 2003).
Another variable included in the models to account for the size of the problem the
market-based programs are confronting is a measure of the percentage of people living in
poverty in the state. The level of poverty in a state is likely to have a significant impact
on the dependent variables included in the model, particularly mortality and gross state
product. Therefore, a higher level of poverty in a state could be expected to hinder the
ability of market-based programs to have a meaningful impact on these dependent
variables. Previous research has shown a significant and positive relationship between
poverty and uninsurance (Bernick and Myers, 2008), which could also hinder the
43

effectiveness of market-based programs. The information regarding state poverty is
taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Statistical Abstract.
The percentage of unemployed people in the state as reported in the U.S. Census
Bureau Statistical Abstract is also included in the analysis. This variable is included in
the analysis as it is expected that the larger the size of the unemployed population in a
state, the more difficult it will be for the market-based health expansion programs to have
a meaningful impact on the dependent variables, particularly as a number of these
programs may assist people in obtaining coverage through their employers. The majority
of Americans, 59.3%, still receive health insurance through their employer (DeNavasWalt, et al, 2007). Examined over time, unemployment has been found to have a
significant and positive relationship with the uninsured (Bernick and Myers, 2008).
A fourth variable included in this category of control variables is the percentage of a
state which is metropolitan. This variable could be relevant to the effect of the marketbased health expansion programs on the dependent variables, as metropolitan areas
confront a number of challenges in regards to quality and delivery of health care
(AMSA.org, 2009). However, it is important to note that these challenges can be counterbalanced to some degree by advantages which metropolitan areas can hold, including
higher levels of economic activity (Metropolitan Policy Program, 2009). Therefore,
taking into account the demographic character of a state in regards to whether it is more
urban or rural could help to clarify the effects of the market-based programs on the
dependent variables. The hypothesized relationships between these control variables and
the dependent variables are illustrated in Table 3-3 below.
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Table 3-3: Hypothesized Relationships between Control Variables Which Limit Access to Health Care and
the Dependent Variables1
Poverty
Unemployment
Uninsured
Metropolitan

State Spending

+

+

+

+

Mortality Per
Capita
Gross State
Product
Emergency
Outpatients
Expenditures
per Patient

+

+

+

+

-

-

-

-

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

Control Variables Which Help to Facilitate the Creation of the General Societal and
Economic Benefits
The third category of control variables focuses on variables which could help to
facilitate the creation of general economic and social benefits through market-based
programs via better health care provision and program implementation. One variable in
this vein is institutional ideology. This is a measure of the liberalism of a state’s
government which was developed by Berry, et al (1998). Public policy literature provides
evidence that programs are more successfully implemented in situations where the
government is more ideologically sympathetic to the program being implemented (Hays,
1996). This research found that more liberal governments more successfully implement
liberal programs, while more conservative governments are more successful in
implementing programs of a conservative nature. This variable was computed as a
weighted average of the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education Scores for the
governor and the state congressional delegation. This variable is on a 0 (very
conservative)-100 (very liberal) scale.
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The model also seeks to account for the level of health infrastructure in the state. The
health infrastructure is measured by the number of hospital beds per 1,000 in the state as
reported in the American Hospital Association Hospital Statistics. For the market-based
state health programs to have the hypothesized effects on the dependent variables, a state
must have the infrastructure to successfully deliver the services which the insurance
coverage provides individuals access to. Therefore it is hypothesized in this study that the
more hospital beds in the state the more effective the market-based health programs will
be in providing economic and health care benefits. The American Medical Student
Association notes the numerous problems which people in both urban and rural areas can
have accessing health care resources that may result in lower quality of life, as does
Hadley (2003) and Wolman and Miller (2004). However, it should be noted that there are
a number of studies (Fischer, et al, 2000; Bazzoli, et al, 2003) suggest a negative
association between hospital capacity and health outcomes.
Another control variable related to capacity included in the analysis is state employees
per capita as reported in The Book of the States. This variable is included as a measure of
state administrative capacity. The hypothesis in regards to this variable is that states with
greater administrative capacity will be in a better position to implement and regulate the
programs in the interest of improved effectiveness. This improved implementation and
regulation will translate into the programs having greater economic and social effects for
the state. Hackey (1998) notes the importance of public administrative capacity, as
erosion in such capacity may limit the ability to engage in major new initiatives or
maintaining existing functions. Under such circumstances government may be
overwhelmed by the private sector. Rich, Deye, and Mazur (2004) argue that state
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governments lack the administrative capacity to engage in large redistributive programs.
While market-based programs are not in need of the same administrative resources as a
program like Medicaid, most of them still require some degree of administration action.

Table 3-4: Hypothesized Relationships between Variables Which Facilitate Access to Health Care
and the Dependent Variables2
Hospital Beds
State Employment
Institutional Ideology
per Capita
per Capita

State Spending

-

-

-

Mortality Per
Capita
Gross State
Product
Emergency
Outpatients
Expenditures per
Patient

-

-

-

+

+

+

-

-

-

-

-

-

Table 3-4 illustrates the hypothesized relationships between the independent variables
of interest and the dependent variables in the analysis.

Descriptive Statistics for the Effectiveness Models
Dependent Variables
Looking at the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used to evaluate the
socioeconomic effects of market-based health insurance programs, the central value for
the dependent variable measuring the percentage of state spending devoted to health was
7.93, indicating that the “middle” state in the data set spent approximately 8% of its
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Table 3-5: Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables
Median
Min.
Max.
Skewness
Mortality
894.3
398.6
1166.3
-.844
State Spending
7.93
1.49
18.82
.710
Emergency
358.5
140.5
610.6
.449
Outpatients
Expenditures
907.8
560.0
1548.7
.603
per Patient
Gross State
90.7
12.3
1044.8
2.8
Product

budget on health care related items. This variable was found to have a slight positive
skew (.710) in relation to the normal distribution. The lowest level of state spending on
health care in the data set 1.49%, and the highest level was 18.82%. The variable
representing the level of mortality per 100,000 in a state was found to have a median of
894.3 and a skewness of -.844. This indicates that the data is centered around 900 deaths
per 100,000 and is skewed slightly in a negative direction when compared to the normal
distribution. The lowest level of mortality per capita recorded in a state was 399 and the
highest level was 1166. The third dependent variable in the effectiveness chapter, gross
state product in constant (2000) dollars, has a median of 90,700,000,000, with a
minimum value of 12,300,000,000 and a maximum value of 1,044.800,000,0000. This
variable actually has a significant positive skew (2.77).
The middle value for the level of emergency outpatients treated per capita in the data
is 358.45, as compared to the minimum value of 140.5 and the maximum value of 610.6.
This data is slightly positively skewed with a value of .449. The median for the
dependent variable examining expenditures per patient per day is $907.80 with a
moderate positive skew of .603. There is significant variability within this data, with a
minimum value of $560 and a maximum value of $1548.70.
Independent Variables
Turning our attention to the independent variables in the effectiveness analysis, the
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primary variable of interest, the index of market-based health expansion programs, had a
mode of 1, indicating that most of the U.S. states during the time period of the study
(49.8%) had adopted one of the market-based expansion programs. The most marketbased programs adapted by any of the states during the period of study was three (out of a
possible five). Turning to another index of interest, measuring the presence and
expansiveness of state high-risk health insurance pools, the mode for this variable was 0,
indicating that during the period of study (1989-2003) most of the states had not enacted
high-risk pools. It should be noted that as of 2009, 34 states have enacted high-risk pools.
Interestingly, while almost half of the cases in the analysis did not have high-risk pools,
25.2% had high-risk pools indexed at 4, indicating that they charged Standard Risk Rates
between 150% and 175% and were relatively affordable. Thus of those states which did
adopt high-risk pools a plurality of them were not priced out of reach for health care
consumers.
Looking at the measures of central tendency for the dummy variables controlling for
other contributors to the expansion of health care access, the SCHIP dummy variable had
a mode of 1 and the Medicaid 1115 variable had a mode of 0, indicating that during the
period of study most states had adopted the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
but most states had not implemented a Medicaid 1115 waiver. Examining the third
variable in the analysis controlling for factors leading to health care expansion, the
median of the unionization variable was 13.7%, indicating that, in general, U.S. states
tend to be about 14% unionized. The lowest level of unionization was 2.4% and the
In the final model, examining the effect of the presence and accessibility of high-risk
pools, as well as other variables, on the expenditures per patient of hospitals in a state, the
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highest level in the dataset was 51.6%. This variable had a positive skew of 1.13.
The next group of variables to be examined is those controlling for factors which
could inhibit the effective of the market-based health expansion programs. The median
for the first of these variables, the percentage of uninsured in the state, was 13.6%. The
lowest level of uninsured in a state was 6.8%, while the highest percentage of uninsured

Table 3-6: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
Median
Mode
Min.
Max.
Market-based
n/a
1
0
3
Index
High-Risk
n/a
0
0
5
Pool Index
Medicaid 1115
n/a
0
0
1
SCHIP
n/a
1
0
1
Unionization
13.7
n/a
2.4
51.6
Uninsured
13.6
n/a
6.8
26.5
Poverty
11.6
n/a
4.5
26.4
Unemployment 5
n/a
.09
10.8
Metropolitan
70
n/a
23.5
100
Institutional
43.5
n/a
0
97.9
Ideology
Beds per
3.1
n/a
1.8
7
Capita
State
172
n/a
103
452
Employment
per Capita

in the Effectiveness Study
Skewness
.768
.270
1.2
-.359
1.13
.694
.773
.138
-.382
.129
.955
2.23

in a state was 26.5%. The second variable in this group, the percentage of a state’s
population in poverty, had a median of 11.6%, with a minimum of 4.5% and a maximum
of 26.4%. The percentage of unemployed in the state, a third variable in the group, had a
median of 5%. The minimum and maximum values for this variable were .09% and
10.8%. All three of these variables were positively skewed. The fourth variable
controlling for factors inhibiting effectiveness, the percentage of metropolitan area in a
state, has a median of 70%, indicating that the “middle” state in the data was mostly
metropolitan in nature. The minimum percentage of metropolitan area in a state was
23.5% and the maximum was 100%. This variable had a negative skew.
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The final group of independent variables controls for factors which may facilitate the
effectiveness of the market-based programs. The median for the first of these controls,
the level of governmental liberalism in a state, was 43.5. As this index ranges from 0100, this indicates that the “middle” value in this data set was actually close the middle of
this range. The value indicates that the median state trended more conservative, as a
higher score on this index indicates greater liberalism. The lowest value in this variable
was 0 and the highest value was 97.9, indicating that this variable does run the full range.
The median value for the second variable in this group, beds per capita in a state, was 3.1,
indicating that the “middle state” in the data set had approximately 3 hospital beds per
1,000 population. The minimum value for this variable is 1.8 beds per capita, and the
highest level of beds per capita was 7.0. The final variable in this group is state
employees per capita. The median value for this variable was 172, indicating that the
“middle state” in this data set had approximately 172 state employees per 100,000
population. The minimum value in this data set was 103 and the maximum value was
452. All three of these variables were positively skewed.

Tests of Regression Assumptions
Multicollinearity
Two tests were run to check for multicollinearity among the variables included in the
effectiveness portion of the dissertation. First bivariate correlations were run to determine
if any of the independent variables were correlated above the .8 threshold suggested in
the methodology literature. None of the variables exceeded the .8 threshold, but two pairs
of variables were found to be highly correlated with each other. The variables for the
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percentage of a state’s population uninsured and the percentage of a state’s population in
poverty were found to have a fairly high level of correlation (0.63). This is not
unexpected, as the literature notes that a significant contributor to uninsurance in
America is the inability to pay. The other high level of correlation was found between the
variables for beds per capita in a state and the percentage of a state’s population
composed of metropolitan areas (-0.53). This finding was also not surprising, as the
literature notes that more urban areas tend to suffer from a lack of health care facilities
due to closures necessitated by financial pressures. For more information, refer to Exhibit
G in the Appendix.
As multicollinearity can seriously bias regression analysis, bivariate regressions were
also conducted to test for this problem. While all the relationships were examined,
particular attention was paid to those variables which were previously found to be highly
correlated. The relationship between poverty and uninsurance was found to have an R
Square of .40, which while not inconsiderable does not suggest that the relationship will
unduly bias the relationship. The bivariate regression for the variables for beds per capita
and percentage of a state composed of metropolitan areas was found to have a relatively
low R Square of .27, indicating that this relationship will also not unduly bias the
regression results. For more information, refer to Exhibit H in the Appendix.
Test for Outliers/Heteroskedasticity
Due to the use of panel data in this study, a number of the available tests for outliers
proved to be problematic. As a result, descriptive statistics were generated to search for
outliers. While there was significant variation between states for some of the values, no
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significant outliers were found within panels. Refer to Table 3-6 for the descriptive
statistics.
The variation among the values for variables among states indicated that the data for
the effectiveness study may violate the assumption of homoskedasticity, which the
literature suggests is common for panel data. Using the STATA software, the BreuschPagan/ Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity was conducted and did find that the
assumption of homoskedasticity was violated. As will be discussed later in the study, this
problem was addressed through the use of a Prais-Winston transformation with panelcorrected standard errors. For more information, refer to Exhibit C in the Appendix.
Test for Normality/Linearity
Two additional regression assumptions that needed to be examined were the normal
distribution of residuals and the linear distribution of residuals. A graph of the Kernel
density estimate was generated using the STATA software and compared to the normal
curve (refer to Exhibit D in the Appendix). Scatterplots for the residuals of the
independent variables were generated to test for linearity. None of the scatterplots
suggested that the linearity assumption had been violated, save for the scatterplots
generated in regard to the dummy variables for the index of market-based expansion
programs, the presence of SCHIP program, and the presence of the Medicaid program
(refer to Exhibit E in the Appendix). A traditional assumption of regression analysis is
that all the variables be measured at the interval level, which would be a prerequisite for
linearity. However, more current methodology literature notes that nominal or ordinal
data can be used in regression analysis provided certain conditions are met (Meier and
Brudney, 2002). The use of the Prais-Winston regression and panel-corrected standard
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errors should help to correct for any issues created by the use of the ordinal dummy
variables.
Test for Autocorrelation
A final regression assumption which needed to be examined in this analysis was that
there is not autocorrelation of the residuals, either across panels or within panels. Using
the STATA software, a Woolridge test was conducted to test for autocorrelation across
panels. The results of this analysis indicate a lack of first-order autocorrelation (see
Exhibit F). To test for autocorrelations within panels, a generalized least squares model
was estimated. Despite the apparent lack of autocorrelation, Prais-Winston regression
with panel-corrected standard errors will still be utilized due to the previously noted
heteroskedasticity. The work of Beck and Katz (1995) suggests that even if there is no
autocorrelation, the results of this analysis will still be accurate.
The preceding tests indicate that the data employed in this portion of the research does
meet most of the traditional regression assumptions. The one issue that the data set seems
to present is one of heteroskedasticity. As previously noted, this issue will be addressed
using Prais-Winston regression with panel-corrected standard errors.

Research Methodology
This portion of the dissertation utilizes a pooled cross-sectional OLS regression model
with panel-corrected standard errors, a methodology most notably advocated by Beck and
Katz (1995). Stimson (1985) noted that this type of pooled time series analysis could be
very robust, “allowing the study of causal dynamics across multiple cases, where the
potential cause may appear at different times in different cases” (p. 916). Incorporating
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time and space into the model can also help to address numerous threats to validity.
However, Stimson also notes that the use of pooled cross-sectional models also raises a
number of statistical issues (Stimson, 1985).
Beck and Katz note that the nature of time series cross-sectional data (which looks at
the different units at different points in time) makes the use of standard OLS difficult as
OLS assumes “all the error processes have the same variance and all of the error
processes are independent of each other” (p. 636). Specifically, the analysis could lead to
correlated errors and problems of heteroscedasticity (p. 634). A form of generalized least
squares developed by Parks (1967) was put forth as a way of addressing these issues,
however Beck and Katz found that this method can seriously understate the variability in
the sample.
In lieu of the Parks methods, Beck and Katz suggest using panel-corrected standard
errors in place of OLS standard errors. Panel-corrected standard errors “pool information
across clusters to estimate error variances” (Johnson, 2004, p. 3). These panel-corrected
standard errors allow for accurate analysis of either panel heteroscedasticity or
contemporaneous correlation of the error terms. This helps to correct the issue raised by
Stimson (1985) that standard OLS will often treat cases in pooled data as independent of
each other, even though they are in fact related. Studies conducted by Beck and Katz
found that panel-corrected standard errors were accurate within 10% of the true
variability in the sample, even with serious heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous
correlation (p. 641). Notably Beck and Katz found that where standard OLS standard
errors did perform well, the PCSE’s still performed well, while PCSE’s were found to
perform well in circumstances where OLS standard errors were not efficient. In regard to
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the Parks GLS method, Beck and Katz found that PCSE’s were 2% more accurate than
Parks standard errors. This form of analysis was used to control for heteroskedasticity in
the data, as well as for autocorrelation of residuals within panels. Further, the standard
errors are calculated independently for each panel.
Beck and Katz (1995) note that researchers using time series cross-sectional data
should address temporal issues with the data through the use of lagged dependent
variables or using a transformation procedure to eliminate serial correlation (p. 645). The
effectiveness model employed in the dissertation utilizes the Prais-Winston
transformation. This is a Generalized Least Squares estimator which is used in the
presence of first order autocorrelation (although serious correlation between panels is not
anticipated). In this process the first observation is transformed so that it does not have to
be censored (Stata glossary, n.d.). Originally the Ochrane-Orcutt procedure was
considered, but the literature indicates that the Cochrane-Orcutt method is problematic
when the data includes lagged endogenous variables (Betancourt and Kelejian, 1981). In
the presence of lagged variables, Ochrane-Orcutt can provide inaccurate information as
the procedure eliminates the first case in the panel. As this research employs lagged
dependent variables, Prais-Winston would be better in this situation as it uses all the
observations in the sample, transforming the first data point in the panel to ensure
homoskedastic standard errors (p. 218). Once this is done time series cross-sectional data
can be analyzed using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors. This form of analysis
will allow conclusions to be drawn about the effect of the market-based health insurance
programs on the dependent variables while remaining cognizant of the fact that each state
has unique characteristics which will impact the effectiveness.

56

Selection of Statistical Software
Intercooled STATA 9 was utilized in the analyses of the effectiveness of market-based
indicates that standard OLS regression will not be sufficient to generate an unbiased
analysis. STATA offers more options for addressing this issue with the data, including
the option which was ultimately utilized, Prais Winston regression with panel-corrected
standard errors. In general, STATA offers numerous options for dealing specifically with
panel data, whereas SPSS is limited in this area.

Analysis
Percentage of State Spending on Health Care
The first model focuses on the relationship between the market-based health care
access expansion efforts and the percentage of state spending devoted to health care. In
this model, the index of market-based state health expansion programs is not found to be
significant at the .05 level.
Control Variables Which May Expand Access to Health Care
The dummy variable for the presence of the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program is also not found to be statistically significant in the analysis, along with the
control variable for the percentage of union membership in a state. The variable
controlling for the use of Medicaid 1115 waivers in the model is found to be statistically
significant and in the negative direction, as hypothesized.
Control Variables Which May Hinder The Effectiveness of Market-based Programs
The variable for the percentage of uninsured people in a state, the percentage of
people in poverty, and the percentage of a state composed of metropolitan areas are found
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to be statistically significant and positive in the analysis. All three of these findings
indicate that these variables hinder the effectiveness of the market-based programs.

Table 3-7: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Percentage of State Spending on Health Care1
Coefficient
Std. Err.
Z
P>z
Market Index
.204
.158
1.30
0.20
Category 1
SCHIP
.016
.190
.0.08
0.93
M1115
-.892
.222
-4.03
.000***
Union Members
-.005
.016
-0.32
0.75
Category 2
Uninsured
Poverty
Unemployment
Metropolitan
Category 3
Institutional
Ideology
Hospital Beds
State Employees
Constant

.081
.086
-.015
.028

.030
.033
.060
.008

2.75
2.62
-0.25
3.38

.006**
.009**
0.810
.001**

-.002

.004

-0.61

0.54

.634
.005
1.57

.166
.002
1.26

3.81
2.68
1.25

.000***
.007**
0.21

Interestingly, the control variable for the percentage of the unemployed in a state is not
found to be statistically significant in the analysis.
Control Variables Which May Facilitate the Effectiveness of Market-based Programs
The variable for institutional ideology is not found to be statistically significant in the
analysis, which indicates that the liberalism of state government did not affect the
percentage of state spending devoted to health care.
Two of the control variables were found to be significant but not in the hypothesized
direction. The control variable measuring the number of beds per 100,000 is found to be
significant and in the positive direction. This runs counter to the hypothesis, which
proposed that a stronger medical infrastructure in a state would translate into lower levels
of health spending. Another control variable looking at employment, this one examining
state employment per capita, is found to be statistically significant and positive in the
model. As this variable is included as a proxy for the administrative capacity of state
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government, it suggests that greater operational and regulatory capacity on the part of the
state translates into higher state health spending. Both of these findings suggest not only
that these variables do not help to facilitate the effectiveness of the market-based
programs, but may actually hinder it.
Mortality Per Capita
The variable for the index of market-based health expansion programs is found to be
statistically significant and negative, indicating that the effort of states to expand access
to health care through market-based programs helps to increase the overall level of health
in a state, as evidenced by a lower mortality rate.
Control Variables Which May Expand Access to Health Care
In this model, the dummy variable controlling for the presence of the SCHIP program
is found to be statistically significant, though not in the hypothesized direction.
According to the model, the presence of the children’s health program was positively
related to mortality in the state, indicating that the presence of the program is associated
with more deaths in a state. In this model, the dummy variable controlling for the use of
Medicaid 1115 waivers and the variable for the percentage of a state’s population which
are union members were not found to be statistically significant.
Control Variables Which May Hinder the Effectiveness of the Market-based Health
Programs
In the model examining the dependent variable of mortality in the state, the variable
for the percentage of uninsured in a state is found to be statistically significant and
negative, suggesting that having more uninsured people in a state decreases the death
rate. Two other control variables, measuring the percentage of people in poverty and the
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percentage of metropolitan area in the state, however, are statistically significant and in
the hypothesized positive direction. A fourth socioeconomic variable, for the percentage
of the unemployed in a state, is not found to be statistically significant.
Control Variables Which May Facilitate the Effectiveness of the Market-based Health
Programs
Among this category of control variables, the variable measuring governmental
liberalism is found to be statistically significant though not in the hypothesized direction.
The analysis found that the presence of a more liberal state government is positively
associated with mortality in the state. The variable for state employees per capita is also
found to be significant, but in the hypothesized direction. The level of per capita state
employment, which was included in the analysis as a proxy for state administrative
capacity, is found to have a significant and negative relationship to mortality.

Table 3-8: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Mortality per Capita1
Coefficient
Std. Err.
Z
Market Index
-7.79
4.01
-1.94
Category 1
SCHIP
13.43
4.77
2.82
M1115
9.10
5.19
1.75
Union Members
-.727
.420
-1.73
Category 2
Uninsured
-1.82
.791
-2.30
Poverty
4.17
.819
5.09
Unemployment
-1.79
1.47
-1.22
Metropolitan
.759
.201
3.78
Category 3
Institutional
.486
.086
5.64
Ideology
Hospital Beds
73.68
3.81
19.33
State Employees
-.729
.058
-12.60
Constant
676.19
29.65
22.80

P>z
0.052*
0.005**
0.080
0.084
0.02*
0.000***
0.22
.000***
0.000***
0.000***
.000***
0.000

The variable measuring the strength of the health infrastructure in a state, beds per
capita, is found to be statistically significant in the analysis, though not in the
hypothesized direction. The relationship between hospital beds per capita and the
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morality level in a state is significant and positive, indicating a stronger health
infrastructure is positively associated with higher levels of mortality.
Gross State Product Per Capita
The following table provides the results of the regression analysis examining the
relationship between the presence and expansiveness of high-risk pools and the level of
expenditures per patient in the state.

Table 3-9: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Gross State Product Per Capita1
Coefficient
Std. Err.
Z
Market Index
5.99
3.09
1.94
Category 1
SCHIP
13.26
3.70
3.59
M1115
.152
3.95
0.04
Union Members
1.98
.338
5.87
Category 2
Uninsured
1.49
.622
2.39
Poverty
2.72
.607
4.48
Unemployment
2.18
1.09
2.00
Metropolitan
3.27
.161
20.27
Category 3
Institutional
.054
.065
0.83
Ideology
Hospital Beds
17.27
2.76
6.26
State Employees
-0.815
.048
-17.04
Constant
-126.53
20.50
-6.17

P>z
0.053*
0.000***
.969
0.000***
.017*
.000***
0.045*
.000***
0.404
.000***
.000***
0.000***

The third model examines the relationship between the index of market-based state
health programs and gross state product per capita. The market-based health program
index variable is statistically significant and positive in this model, indicating that more
effort put forth by states in terms of the adoption of state health expansion programs
translates into economic benefits for the state as a whole.
Control Variables Which May Expand Access to Health Care
The dummy variable controlling for the presence of the SCHIP program is found to be
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statistically significant and positive in the model. This supports the hypothesis that the
presence of the program to expand access to health care for uninsured children has
positive economic effects for a state. The control variable for the percentage of a state’s
population that is union members is also found to be statistically significant and in the
hypothesized direction, indicating that a higher level of union members in a state benefits
the people of a state economically. The dummy variable for the Medicaid 1115 waivers is
not found to be statistically significant.
Control Variables Which May Hinder the Effectiveness of Market-based Health
Programs
The variables for the percentage of a state’s population that is uninsured and a state’s
population that is in poverty are both found to be statistically significant, but not in the
hypothesized direction. Both variables are found to have a positive relationship with
gross state product, whereas they were hypothesized to have a negative relationship. The
result for the variable for the percentage of unemployed people in the state is also
difficult to explain. This variable is also statistically significant, but was also found not to
be in the hypothesized direction. The final control variable in the analysis is the variable
for the percentage of a state which is metropolitan in nature. This variable is found to be
positive and statistically significant in the analysis, which was not as hypothesized but is
not entirely counterintuitive as metropolitan areas tend to be transportation and
manufacturing centers and thus generate economic activity.
Control Variables Which May Facilitate the Effectiveness of the Market-based Programs
The level of governmental liberalism was not found to have a significant relationship
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with the gross state product of a state. The variable for beds per capita is significant and
positive in the model, indicating that a stronger medical infrastructure in a state helps to
foster better economic conditions, as hypothesized. The variable for the percentage of
state employment is also found to be statistically significant in the analysis, but not in the
hypothesized direction. The variable is found to have a negative relationship with gross
state product, indicating that a higher level of state administrative capacity does not yield
economic benefits for a state.
Emergency Outpatients Treated

Table 3-10: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Emergency Outpatients Treated1
Coefficient
Std. Err.
Z
Market Index
-11.35
3.59
-3.16
Category 1
SCHIP
4.71
4.24
1.11
M1115
5.26
5.18
5.18
Union Members
-.569
.326
-1.74
Category 2
Uninsured
-2.77
.687
-4.03
Poverty
3.15
.746
4.21
Unemployment
3.98
1.35
2.94
Metropolitan
-.495
.195
-2.54
Category 3
Institutional
.140
.081
1.72
Ideology
Hospital Beds
14.28
3.22
4.43
State Employees
-.326
.059
-5.53
Constant
391.77
30.10
13.02

P>z
0.002**
0.267
.309
0.081
.000***
.000***
0.003**
.011**
.086
.000***
.000***
0.000

The variable for the index of market-based state health programs is found to have a
significant and negative relationship to emergency outpatients treated, which indicates
that market-based programs are effective in reducing reliance on emergency rooms.
Control Variables Which May Expand Access to Health Care
The dummy variables controlling for the presence of the State Children’s Health

63

Insurance Program and Medicaid 1115 waivers are not found to be statistically significant
in the analysis. Another variable related to health care access, the variable for the
percentage of a state’s population that are members of unions, is found to be statistically
significant in the analysis, and in this case negative. This supports the hypothesis that in
states which are more heavily unionized people have greater access to preventative health
coverage.
Control Variables Which May Hinder the Effectiveness of the Market-based Programs
Two control variables in this category, percentage of people in poverty and percentage
unemployed, are statistically significant and in the hypothesized (positive) direction. This
indicates that having more people impoverished and more people on the unemployment
rolls leads to more emergency room usage. One control variable which is statistically
significant in the analysis (but not in the hypothesized direction) is the variable for the
percentage of a state’s population which is uninsured. This variable is found to be
negative in the analysis, which is counterintuitive since one would expect a higher
percentage of uninsured people to translate into higher levels of emergency room usage.
The final variable in the analysis, the percentage of a state composed of metropolitan
areas, is also found to be statistically significant and negative in the analysis. This is
rather counterintuitive, as it was hypothesized that a larger metropolitan area in a state
would translate into higher levels of emergency room usage.
Control Variables Which May Facilitate the Effectiveness of the Market-based Programs
Institutional ideology is found not to be significant in the analysis, again indicating
that the ideology of state government does not have a meaningful association with stress
being placed on the medical infrastructure. The variable for state employees per capita is
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found to be statistically significant and negative in the analysis, which supports the
hypothesis that a state’s administrative capacity may facilitate a higher level of
effectiveness in regards to the market-based health expansion programs. The variable for
measuring a state’s medical capacity, beds per capita, is also found to be statistically
significant in the analysis, although in this case not in the hypothesized direction. The
analysis finds a positive relationship between hospital beds per capita and emergency
room utilization.
Expenditures per Patient
The final model in this portion of the study examines the role of market-based health
expansion programs on hospital expenditures per patient. In this model, the variable for
the index of market-based health expansion programs is not found to be significant. The
finding for the market-based health program index in this model supports the finding in
the model examining the percentage of state spending devoted to health care, indicating
that these programs do not have a significant effect on the cost of providing health care.
Control Variables Which May Expand Access to Health Care
One of the dummy variables controlling for the use of government-based health care,
representing Medicaid 1115 waivers, is not found to be statistically significant in the
analysis, which makes it unclear how, if at all, these programs affect hospital costs for
treating patients. Interestingly, the variable controlling for the presence of the SCHIP
program was found to be statistically significant, but not in the hypothesized direction.
The presence of the SCHIP program was found to be significant and positive, indicating
that the presence of the program is positively associated with an increase in expenditures
per patient in the state.
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Table 3-11: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Expenditures per Capita
Market Index
Category 1
SCHIP
M1115
Union Members
Category 2
Uninsured
Poverty
Unemployment
Metropolitan
Category 3
Institutional
Ideology
Hospital Beds
State Employees
Constant

Coefficient
5.52

Std. Err.
6.34

Z
0.87

P>z
0.384

83.42
5.10
2.87

8.08
8.50
.715

10.32
0.60
4.02

0.000***
.548
0.000***

-9.85
4.64
4.58
3.66

1.30
1.32
2.53
.316

-7.57
3.50
1.81
11.55

.000***
.000***
0.070
.000***

.849

.149

5.72

0.000***

91.81
-.029
316.63

6.75
.118
52.88

13.61
-0.25
5.99

.000***
.805
0.000***

The percentage of a state’s population that belongs to unions is also found to be
significant in the analysis, though in the positive direction. This is counterintuitive, as it
was hypothesized that higher levels of unionization would result in lower expenditures
per patient due to greater access to health care.
Control Variables Which May Hinder the Effectiveness of the Market-based Programs
The variable for the percentage of uninsured in a state is statistically significant in the
analysis, although again not in the hypothesized direction. The analysis suggests that a
higher level of uninsured people in a state translates into lower expenses per patient. The
variable for the percentage of people in a state in poverty is also found to be statistically
significant, but this time in the hypothesized, positive direction. Another variable in the
analysis, the percentage of a state which is composed of metropolitan areas, was found to
be statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction. The variable is found to have
a positive relationship with expenditures per patient, indicating that such areas tend to
experience higher health care costs. A final variable in this category was the variable for
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the percentage of unemployed people in a state, which was not found to be statistically
significant.
Control Variables Which May Facilitate the Effectiveness of Market-based Health
Programs
The variable for institutional ideology is found to be statistically significant in this
analysis, however it was found to have a positive relationship with expenditures per
patient. This suggests that a more liberal government contributes to higher health care
costs. Another variable related to capacity, hospital beds per capita, was also found to be
statistically significant and positive in the analysis. The variable included to measure a
state government’s administrative capacity, state employees per capita, was not found to
be statistically significant in the analysis.

Study of the Effectiveness of State High-Risk Health Insurance Pools
As this study is particularly interested in the role of state high-risk health insurance
pools, a complementary analysis was conducted examining the effectiveness of the pools
in regard to improving performance in state health care spending, overall health,
economic productivity, and health infrastructure. These models seek to examine, not only
the effects of the presence of the high-risk pools, but also the effects of the level of
expansiveness of the programs in regard to their affordability. This market-based
program is of particular interest as the high-risk pools are the most widely adopted
programs at issue in this study.
One issue that has served to limit the effectiveness of high-risk pools is the fact that
these programs charge premiums which can be set at levels considerably above average
market value in the state (Achman and Chollet, 2001). In this portion of the study, the
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high-risk health insurance pools, which vary significantly from state to state, were also
indexed according to their maximum standard risk rate allowed by law (in essence the
maximum percentage of the average insurance premium in the state which the risk pool is
allowed to charge clients). States that permit a lower SSR receive a higher score on the
index, as the lower the SSR the more affordable the high-risk coverage is to purchase.
Those states that have no maximum SSR rate received a 1 on the high-risk pool index, as
there is no legal ceiling to how expensive the coverage may become. States with a
maximum SSR of 250% received a 2, and those states with a maximum SSR of 200%
received a 3. The states with a maximum SSR between 150-175% received a 4 on the
index, with the most generous states, those with an SSR below 150%, receiving the
highest score of 5 on the index.
The purpose of this study is to examine how the accessibility of a market-based health
expansion program (in terms of its affordability) affects its ability to have a meaningful
effect on indicators such as state health care spending, state mortality, gross state product,
emergency patients treated, and expenditures per patient. The primary hypothesis of
interest in this study is that the more affordable the high-risk pool is (in terms of having a
lower maximum standard risk rate) the more effective the program will be. This is a
particularly important hypothesis to test in regard to market-based health expansion
efforts, as these programs are not designed, like Medicaid and SCHIP, to provide health
care to those who have an inability to pay. This is especially true of high-risk pools,
where clients are by design paying above the average market rate for coverage.
This study utilizes the same control variables as were used in the previous study of
market-based expansion efforts. The hypotheses in regard to these variables are the same
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as those in the previous study, as they are expected to have the same effects on the
relationship between the presence and expansiveness of high-risk pools and the
dependent variables. The purpose of the study is to focus more narrowly on this one
particular program, and to what degree it is effective in regard to improving the social
and economic measures.
The high-risk pools are of special interest because, as noted previously, they represent
a hybrid of government-based programs and market-based initiatives. The pools are
created through legislative or regulatory action, but then largely function as a private firm
would, charging premiums and placing certain limitations on coverage. In a number of
states, legislators or other government officials may serve on the board overseeing the
pools. The governor has statutory authority to appoint the members of the governing
board in a number of states. However, representatives of private health insurance firms
are often included on the boards as well (Comprehensive Health Insurance, 2007). A fair
amount of research has been done in terms of examining high-risk pools regarding their
viability for meaningfully expanding access to health care (Achman and Chollet, 2001;
Abbe, 2002). However, as was the case for the other market-based health expansion
programs, not much research attention has been devoted to the other potential
developmental effects of these programs. This study makes an attempt to fill this gap.
In the first model, examining the dependent variable of percentage of state general
revenue devoted to health care, the primary independent variable of interest, the index
measuring the presence and affordability of the high-risk pools, is found to be statistically
significant. However, the variable does not perform in the hypothesized direction. The
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variable is found to have positive relationship to the percentage of state health care
spending.

Table 3-12: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Percentage of State Spending on Health Care
(High-Risk Pools)3 1
HR Pool Index
Category 1
SCHIP
M1115
Union Members
Category 2
Uninsured
Poverty
Unemployment
Metropolitan
Category 3
Institutional
Ideology
Hospital Beds
State Employees
Constant

Coefficient
.652

Std. Err.
.104

Z
6.30

P>z
0.000***

-.102
-1.02
.005

.197
.220
.018

-0.52
-4.62
0.27

0.605
0.000***
0.785

.092
.113
.014
.041

.032
.033
.061
.009

2.90
3.41
0.23
4.74

.004**
.001**
0.815
.000***

-.002

.004

-0.52

0.60

.591
.006
-.507

.172
.002
1.34

3.44
2.62
-0.38

.001**
.009**
0.705

In the second model in this study, looking at the dependent variable for mortality per
capita in a state, the variable for the presence and affordability of the high-risk pools is
found to be statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction. This finding
indicates that the state high-risk health insurance pools do show some success in
improving overall state health, as evidenced by a reduction in mortality per capita.
The third analysis in this study looks at the effect of the high-risk pool index and other
variables on the economic productivity of a state as measured by its gross state product.
In this model, the variable for the presence and affordability of high-risk pools was found
to be statistically significant, but not in the hypothesized direction. The results of this
analysis actually indicate that the presence of more expansive high-risk pools has a
negative relationship to gross state product.
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Table 3-13: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Mortality per Capita (High-Risk Pools)
HR Pool Index
Category 1
SCHIP
M1115
Union Members
Category 2
Uninsured
Poverty
Unemployment
Metropolitan
Category 3
Institutional
Ideology
Hospital Beds
State Employees
Constant

Coefficient
-9.07

Std. Err.
2.87

Z
-3.16

P>z
0.002**

13.59
7.26
-.545

4.69
5.16
.413

2.90
1.41
-1.32

0.004**
0.160
0.186

-1.99
4.25
-1.58
.566

.780
.805
1.46
.203

-2.55
5.28
-1.08
2.79

.011**
.000***
0.279
.005**

.506

.085

5.98

0.000***

75.67
-.740
686.97

3.80
.057
29.35

19.90
-12.96
23.41

.000***
.000***
0.000***

Table 3-14: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Gross State Product (High-Risk Pools)
Coefficient
HR Pool Index
Category 1
SCHIP
M1115
Union Members
Category 2
Uninsured
Poverty
Unemployment
Metropolitan
Category 3
Institutional
Ideology
Hospital Beds
State Employees
Constant

Std. Err.

Z

P>z

2.39

-2.98

0.003**

14.66
.627
1.65

3.78
4.14
.344

3.87
0.15
4.81

0.000***
0.88
0.000***

1.20
2.53
1.80
3.35

.622
.614
1.09
.173

1.92
4.12
1.64
19.43

.055
.000***
0.10
.000***

-.009

.064

-.14

0.89

16.74
-.838
-95.42

2.99
.057
23.30

5.60
-14.65
-4.10

.000***
.000***
0.000***

-7.12

In the model examining the dependent variable of emergency outpatients treated, the
variable for the presence and affordability of high-risk pools is statistically significant
and in the hypothesized direction. This indicates that high-risk pools do have an effect in
terms of reducing reliance on emergency room care, by providing people greater access
to preventative medical care. This is a potentially very important finding, as reducing
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reliance on emergency room care can serve to reduce financial pressures on hospitals,
which can be beneficial to the health infrastructure in a state in a number of ways.
The results of this analysis can be found in the table below.

Table 3-15: Regression Results for Effectiveness on Emergency Outpatients Treated (High-Risk
Pools) 4
HR Pool Index
Category 1
SCHIP
M1115
Union Members
Category 2
Uninsured
Poverty
Unemployment
Metropolitan
Category 3
Institutional
Ideology
Hospital Beds
State Employees
Constant

Coefficient
-6.78

Std. Err.
2.39

Z
-2.84

P>z
0.005**

3.57
2.10
-.475

4.15
5.19
.328

0.86
0.40
-1.45

0.39
0.69
0.147

-2.79
2.84
4.01
-.617

.674
.738
1.34
.205

-4.14
3.85
3.00
-3.00

.000***
.000***
0.003**
.003**

.148

.081

1.83

0.07

12.16
-.349
411.35

3.08
.058
30.52

3.95
-6.01
13.48

.000***
.000***
0.000***

In the final model, examining the effect of the presence and accessibility of high-risk
pools, as well as other variables, on the expenditures per patient of hospitals in a state, the
variable for the presence and accessibility of high-risk pools was found to be statistically
significant and in the hypothesized direction. The analysis indicates that high-risk pools
have a negative relationship to expenditures per capita, providing evidence that the
programs serve to reduce the cost of treating people in a state.
Both the analyses focused on market-based programs in general and the high-risk
pools in particular provide evidence that those market-based programs provide positive
developmental social and economic effects. The next chapter will discuss the results
regarding the effects of market-based programs and high-risk pools in greater depth, as
well as examining the results of the control variables. This discussion will shed more
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light on the effects of the programs on the dependent variables, as well as what effects the
control variables have on the relationship between the indexes and the dependent
variables. The results of the analysis for the final model examining the relationship
between high-risk pools and expenditures per patient are below.

Table 3-16: Regression Results for Expenditures per Patient (High-Risk Pools)5
Coefficient
Std. Err.
Z
HR Pool Index
-13.76
4.77
-2.88
Category 1
SCHIP
87.22
8.23
10.60
M1115
-.514
8.67
-0.06
Union Members
2.87
.706
4.07
Category 2
Uninsured
-8.35
1.30
-6.40
Poverty
4.55
1.35
3.36
Unemployment
5.09
2.51
2.03
Metropolitan
3.47
.332
10.46
Category 3
Institutional
.767
.148
5.19
Ideology
Hospital Beds
88.85
6.98
12.72
State Employees
-.071
.123
-0.58
Constant
347.44
55.89
6.22
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P>z
0.004**
0.000***
0.953
0.000***
.000***
.001**
0.042*
.000***
0.000***
.000***
.563
0.000***

CHAPTER 3
INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS STUDY
Market-based Health Program Index/High-Risk Pool Index
Percentage of State Spending Devoted to Health Care
Looking at the relationship between the presence of market-based programs and the
percentage of state spending devoted to health care, the analysis found that this
relationship was not statistically significant. This may be due to the fact that most of the
programs included in the index do little to assist those individuals who would be eligible
for assistance under government-based programs.
In regard to the relationship between the high-risk pool index and percentage of state
health spending, the relationship was found to be statistically significant but not in the
hypothesized direction. The results of the analysis indicate that the presence and
expansiveness of a high-risk pool increases the percentage of state spending devoted to
health care. This finding is not exactly counterintuitive, however, as high-risk pools do
require some significant degree of state spending in the implementation of the pools and,
in some states, for the operation of the pool. These pools also extend coverage to people
who are likely to utilize frequent and extensive health care over the course of their life.
These factors could result in higher, rather than lower, levels of state spending. Other
factors which may be contributing to this positive relationship may include limited
disenrollment from the program, statutory limits on premiums which can be charged, and
the fact that the pools regularly operate at a loss (Morrissey, 2008). In 2003, the
premiums collected by high-risk pools covered only about 55-59% of operating expenses
(Comprehensive Health Insurance, 2006 as cited by Morrissey, 2008).
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Mortality per Capita
Focusing on the model examining the dependent variable of state mortality per capita,
the index of market-based programs was found to have a statistically significant and
negative relationship to the dependent variable. This lends credence to the notion that
greater access to health care through these programs translates into better health
outcomes through greater access to preventative care and other health services.
The previous finding is supported by the finding regarding the relationship between
the high-risk index and the dependent variable. This is logical, because, as previously
noted, high-risk pools predominantly serve people who require considerable amounts of
health care, without which chronic conditions could degenerate into catastrophic
conditions. This finding would seem to indicate that the pools are successful in this goal,
possibly through increasing access to preventative health care.
Gross State Product
The findings concerning the relationships between the index of market-based
programs/ high-risk pool index and the gross state product are conflicting. The analysis
indicates that a greater presence of market-based programs in a state has a statistically
significant and positive relationship to the gross product of a state. This lends support to
the hypothesis that the presence of these programs benefit the economy of a state
(Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007; Battistella and Kuder, 1993; Hall, 2000).
However, this economic benefit was not found in the analysis of the relationship
between the high-risk pool index and the gross state product. In that model, the presence
and expansiveness of high-risk pools was found to be significantly related to gross state
product, but not in the hypothesized direction. This analysis suggests that high-risk pools
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actually exert a drag on a state’s economy. One potential explanation for this finding in
regard to high-risk pools is that part of the funding for the pools comes from assessments
on private insurers, taxes on hospitals, and other charges which could be seen as drains
on the economy of a state. This may also be a by-product of the losses incurred by the
pools due to inadequate funding (Morrissey, 2008). More research should be conducted
to examine economic gains versus economic losses in regard to high-risk pools.
Emergency Outpatients Treated
Examining the relationship between the presence of market-based health expansion
programs and emergency room utilization, the presence of the market-based programs
was found to significantly reduce emergency outpatients treated per capita in a state. This
supports the hypothesis that these programs serve to improve access to preventative
health care and reduce the need for uncompensated emergency room care. If these
programs do have this effect, it suggests that they can play a significant role in reducing
the pressures on hospital finances and resources created by the uninsured’s reliance on
emergency room care. Reducing these pressures could serve to generate a number of
other positive effects, which should be considered in future research.
The hypothesis that market-based programs can decrease dependence on emergency
room care is also supported by the statistically significant and negative relationship
between the high-risk pool index and emergency outpatients treated per capita.
Individuals deemed to be high-risk and medically uninsurable by insurance companies
may have no alternative but to seek extensive and expensive care in emergency rooms on
a regular basis due to their lack of coverage. Therefore, extending coverage to such
individuals through high-risk pools and allowing them to receive regular treatment would
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be expected to take some of the pressure off of emergency rooms. This benefit to
emergency rooms could have important positive effects for health care in a state in
general.
Expenditures per Capita
The benefits that hospitals gained from market-based programs in general in terms of
emergency room usage do not seem to translate to hospital expenditures per patient. This
indicates that these programs do not have a meaningful impact in terms of reducing
hospitals’ costs for providing health care. This supports the finding for this variable in
regard to the model looking at the percentage of state spending devoted to health care.
This may be due to the fact that these programs do allow those who have previously
been denied access to health care to receive it, including certain high-risk individuals who
may require extensive and expensive health care. One interesting finding from a study by
Levit, et al (2003) was that increased hospital utilization between the years 2000 and
2001 resulted in an increase in hospital labor costs in areas such as “nursing,
pharmacology, imaging technology, and lab technology.” This resulted in growth of
average hospital employee earnings in that year of 6.1 percent (Levit, et al, 2002).
Research also indicates that preventative health care does not necessarily save money
(Garson and Engelhard, 2008). If increases in utilization do have these kinds of effects on
hospitals, then it stands to reason that programs to expand access to health care do not
necessarily result in lower levels of health spending by states or hospitals.
Interestingly, the index measuring the presence and expansiveness of high-risk pools
was found to have a significant and negative relationship to expenditures per patient. This
is interesting, as high-risk pools are intended to extend coverage to people who are most
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in need of regular, extensive, and expensive health care. Thus, one could anticipate that
allowing such individuals to have greater access to health care could increase
expenditures. However, this finding supports the stated hypothesis that the presence and
greater expansiveness of high-risk pools help to alleviate the level of expenditures by
allowing people to take advantage of preventative care, which obviates the need for more
expensive catastrophic care in the future. This lends some support to the hypothesis that
extending access to preventative care to uninsured individuals, particularly those who are
in serious need of medical care, can serve to prevent such individuals from requiring
more extensive and expensive medical care in the future. It should also be noted that most
high-risk pools include disease management programs, which helps to prevent chronic
conditions from becoming catastrophic (Comprehensive Health Insurance, 2007).
In regard to the indexes of market-based health expansion programs and high-risk
pools, the two indexes perform similarly in the models for two of the dependent
variables. In the models measuring effects on mortality per capita and emergency
outpatients treated per capita, the two indexes have negative relationships to the
dependent variables. This indicates that both higher levels of overall state effort in regard
to implementing market-based health expansion efforts and the effect of one type of
market-based health expansion effort, the high-risk pool, were statistically significant in
reducing mortalities and emergency room usage in a state.
The findings in regard to these independent variables, however, did differ in their
performance in the other models. In the models examining the percentage of state
spending devoted to health care, the index of market-based health expansion programs
was not statistically significant, while the index of high-risk pools was found to be
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statistically significant and positive in the analysis. However, in the case of high-risk
pools there is some statistical evidence that the presence and level of expansiveness of
these programs may drive up the cost of state health spending. While counter to the
formally stated hypothesis, this finding is not counterintuitive. Some high-risk pools do
require a portion of general revenue funds to finance the deficit created by the fact that
premiums taken in are not equal to the medical costs incurred by program clients (Howitt,
2008).
Control Variables that Expand Access to Health Care
Looking at the first category of control variables, which, like the market-based
programs, may expand access to health care, there is some evidence that the SCHIP and
Medicaid 1115 programs may contribute to the provision of general social and economic
benefits. Looking at the dependent variable for state spending, there is statistical evidence
that the Medicaid 1115 waivers are contributing to lower state spending in both the
market-based and high-risk pool models. The variable controlling for the presence of the
SCHIP program and the variable for the percentage of a state’s population that belong to
unions were found to positively contribute to economic productivity in a state. However,
the other relationships in this category of control variables were found not to be
significant or the relationships were not in the hypothesized direction. Future research
should focus on the degree to which federally-based programs are successful in providing
general benefits to the people of a state, as well as the degree to which unions are still a
powerful actor in the health care area.
The table below summarizes the statistical results for the analysis examining the
relationship between market-based programs and the dependent variables.
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Table 4-1: Summary of Effectiveness Results1

Market-Based
Index
Category 1
Controls
SCHIP
Medicaid 1115
Unionization
Category 2
Controls
Uninsured
Poverty
Unemployment
Metropolitan
Category 3
Controls
Beds Per Capita
State Employment
per Capita
Institutional
Ideology

State
Spending on
Health Care
Not
Significant

Mortality per
Capita

Gross State
Product

Expenditures
per Patient

Positive (H)

Emergency
Outpatients
Treated
Negative (H)

Negative (H)

Not
Significant
Negative (H)

Positive (NH)

Positive (H)

Not Significant

Positive (NH)

Not
Significant
Positive (H)

Not Significant

Not Significant

Not
Significant

Not
Significant
Not
Significant

Not Significant

Positive (NH)

Positive (H)
Positive (H)
Not
Significant
Positive (H)

Negative (NH)
Positive (H)
Not
Significant
Positive (H)

Positive (NH)
Positive (NH)
Positive (NH)

Negative (NH)
Positive (H)
Positive (H)

Negative (NH)
Positive (H)
Not Significant

Positive (NH)

Negative (NH)

Positive (H)

Positive (NH)
Positive (NH)

Positive (NH)
Negative (H)

Positive (NH)
Negative (H)

Positive (NH)
Not Significant

Not
Significant

Positive (NH)

Positive (H)
Negative
(NH)
Not
Significant

Not Significant

Positive (NH)

Not Significant

Control Variables That May Hinder the Effectiveness of Market-based Programs
Looking at the control variables which may constrain access to health care and thus
make it more difficult for the market-based health insurance programs to provide general
economic and social benefits to the population of a state, the variable for the percent
uninsured was found to be significant and positive in relation to state spending, providing
evidence that a higher level of uninsurance in a state can increase state spending on
health care. The variable for the percentage of a state’s population in poverty was found
to have a statistically significant relationship with four of the dependent variables, and all
of these relationships were in the hypothesized direction. The poverty variable was found
to have a significant and positive relationship with state spending on health, mortality per
capita, emergency outpatients treated, and expenditures per patient. These findings
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indicate that poverty is a powerful societal force in a state and does appear to stand in
opposition to the ability of market-based health expansion programs and other such
efforts to deliver economic and social benefits. The control variable for the percentage of
unemployed people in a state was found to have a significant and positive relationship to
emergency room utilization, and the variable for the percentage of metropolitan area in a
state was related to increases in state health care spending, mortality, and expenditures
per patient. While the relationships between these control variables and the dependent
variables were mixed, there is some convincing evidence that these variables may
constrain the benefits of any health expansion program, including market-based
programs.
Control Variables Which May Facilitate the Creation of Benefits through Improved
Program Implementation
The control variables expected to create the conditions that would better permit
programs such as the market-based programs to deliver social and economic benefits
performed most counterintuitively. This was particularly true of the variable for hospital
beds per capita in a state, which was included in the analysis as a measure of state
medical infrastructure. This variable was found to have statistically significant and
positive relationships with state health spending, mortality per capita, emergency
outpatients treated, and expenditures per capita. It was hypothesized that a stronger health
infrastructure would be effective in alleviating these problems, acting in conjunction with
programs such as the market-based health expansion programs. Most of the findings
suggest the opposite, although the relationship between hospital beds per capita and gross
state product was as hypothesized, indicating that stronger medical infrastructure does
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contribute to better economic productivity. The variable for state employment per capita
(included in the analysis as a measure of state administrative capacity) performs more in
line with the hypotheses, however, it still had counterintuitive relationships with the
percentage of state spending on health care (positive) and gross state productive
(negative). However, the results do indicate state administrative capacity does facilitate
the creation of social and economic benefits by reducing mortality per capita and
emergency outpatients treated. A third variable in this category, the variable for
government liberalism, was not statistically significant in its relationship to three of the
dependent variables. In the relationships where the institutional ideology variable was
significant (mortality per capita and expenditures per capita) the results were positive as
opposed to negative. Taken as a whole, these variables do not appear to be effective in
facilitating the sort of social and economic benefits discussed in this research. These
variables are most in need of careful study.
The preceding analyses indicate that market-based health expansion programs can be
successful in providing general economic and societal benefits to a state, such as reducing
overall mortality, boosting economic productivity, and reducing reliance on emergency
room usage. However, the adoption of these programs throughout the United States has
been relatively limited. As suggested by previous research and the events of the national
health reform debate of 2009, there are significant partisan and ideological differences of
opinion in regard to how to best expand access to health care. Liberal Democrats
advocate a plan which includes a federally-administered insurance program, while
conservative Republicans argue for reforms in the existing private insurance system.
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Table 4-2: Summary of Effectiveness Results
State Spending Mortality per
on Health Care Capita

High-Risk Pool
Index
Category 1
Controls
SCHIP
Medicaid 1115
Unionization
Category 2
Controls
Uninsured
Poverty
Unemployment
Metropolitan
Category 3
Controls
Beds Per Capita
State Employment
per Capita
Institutional
Ideology

Gross State
Product

Emergency
Outpatients
Treated
Negative (H)

Expenditures
per Patient

Positive (NH)

Negative (H)

Negative (NH)

Not
Significant
Negative (H)

Positive (NH)

Positive (H)

Not
Significant

Not
Significant
Not
Significant

Not
Significant
Positive (H)

Positive (H)

Negative (NH)

Negative (NH)

Negative (NH)

Positive (H)
Not
Significant
Positive (H)

Positive (H)
Not
Significant
Positive (H)

Not
Significant
Positive (NH)
Not
Significant
Positive (NH)

Positive (H)
Positive (H)

Positive (H)
Positive (H)

Negative (NH)

Positive (H)

Positive (NH)
Positive (NH)

Positive (NH)
Negative (H)

Positive (H)
Negative (NH)

Positive (NH)
Negative (H)

Not
Significant

Positive (NH)

Not
Significant

Not
Significant

Positive (NH)
Not
Significant
Positive (NH)

Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Not
Significant

Negative (H)

Positive (NH)
Not
Significant
Positive (NH)

However, these divisions may not be as cut and dried as they appear at first glance.
After all, it was a Democratic Sen. Kent Conrad of South Dakota, who proposed the idea
of regional non-profit cooperatives which people could buy into in order to purchase
insurance as an alternative to the federally-operated program put forth by the Obama
administration. In fact, a number of conservative Democrats, or “blue dogs,” were critical
of the Obama administration’s public option to allow people to receive coverage directly
from the federal government. Also, the opening example of the TennCare and Cover
Tennessee programs illustrated how a Democratic governor transitioned from a broader,
government-based program to a more narrowly focused market-based approach. This is
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indicative that the environment in which health care policy is made is increasingly
complex politically, with some Democrats advocating for what would conventionally be
considered a conservative approach to health care expansion. Given the results of the
previous analyses, perhaps these Democrats, like Governor Bredesen of Tennessee, have
come to view market-based reforms as a meaningful alternative to the government-based
programs they may find difficult to sell to their constituents. In the next chapter, this
dissertation will examine the role of Democratic control of the state legislature and
citizen ideology, in addition to other political and societal variables, in the adoption of
market-based programs. This study will examine the commonly held position that the
degree to which market-based reforms can gain traction is determined by the ideological
nature of the states and partisan makeup of the legislature.
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CHAPTER 4
ADOPTION OF MARKET-BASED STATE
HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM
Introduction
During the 1990’s and early 2000’s states adopted a number of incremental, marketbased programs to address the growing problem of the uninsured, including high-risk
pools, reinsurance programs, limited benefit plans, group purchasing arrangements, and
HIFA waivers. Based on the results presented in Chapters Three and Four, these
programs have been effective in producing general socioeconomic benefits for a state, yet
they have not been as widely adopted throughout the United States as more governmentbased programs such as the State Children’s Health Insurance Plan. Part of this could be
attributed to the fact that many of the programs under consideration were only
implemented in the wake of the failure of the Clinton health care plan, so there has been a
relatively limited amount of time for the knowledge of the program’s effects to spread.
Another factor, as noted in Chapter Three, is that the evaluations of the market-based
programs to this point have been focused on relatively narrow outputs. However, as
evidenced by the significant body of policy adoption literature, there are many factors at
the state level which affect whether or not states choose to adopt different programs. It is
anticipated that a stronger understanding of the factors which lead to the adoption of
market-based health insurance programs would help to understand the nature of the
programs and the socioeconomic effects they create at the state-level. For example,
looking at the citizen ideology covariate included in the adoption model, finding that
market-based health insurance programs are more favored by liberal or conservative
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policymakers could influence the way we interpret the programs’ results in areas such as
state spending, mortality, gross state product, emergency outpatients treated, and
expenditures per patient.
This chapter examines the political, economic, and social factors which contribute to
the adoption of market-based health expansion programs. The primary hypothesis for this
model is that states with a more liberal citizen ideology and a higher percentage of
Democratic lawmakers are less likely to adopt state high-risk health insurance pools and
other market-based health expansion programs.
This issue is again raised by the experience of the TennCare and Cover Tennessee
programs. The TennCare program, an effort toward universal health care within the
boundaries of Tennessee, was enacted by Democratic governor Ned McWhirter. This is
not surprising as traditionally Democratic policy makers have been more supportive of
government-based efforts to expand access to health care, such as Medicaid, Medicare,
and SCHIP. However, it must also be noted that it was also a Democratic governor, Phil
Bredesen, who sacrificed efforts to preserve TennCare as a broad-based health care
program in order to enact the more narrowly focused, market-based Cover Tennessee
program. This disconnect between the commonly accepted health policy paradigm (i.e.
Democrats favor more broad-based government programs) was also seen in the 2009
congressional debate over the health reform plan proposed by the Obama administration.
During the course of this debate, numerous more fiscally conservative members of the
Democratic party raised serious concerns about the proposed national health care plan.
Particular concern was focused on the notion of the public option, a federally-operated
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alternative to private health insurance, with many Democrats expressing skepticism or
outright opposition.
All of this highlights the complicated relationships between ideology, partisanship,
and health care policy. It should be noted that the role of ideology in the adoption of
market-based programs can be particularly complicated due to the nature of the
programs. Market-based health program utilize the private market rather than relying on
the expansion of government-based care, however these programs are still intended to
expand access to health care which is a traditionally liberal policy goal. In this chapter,
the influence of ideology, partisanship and other political and socioeconomic factors on
the adoption of market-based state health access expansion programs will be analyzed
using a Cox proportional hazard model. This analysis will hopefully shed additional light
on the counterintuitive findings regarding the institutional ideology variable in the
previous analysis, as well as provide some statistical context for the previous example of
the TennCare/Cover Tennessee program.

Model Development
Throughout recent U.S. history, expanding access to health care, particularly for the
poor or underprivileged, has been a cause championed by liberal Democrats (Weissert
and Weissert, 2006). However, recent scholarship in the area of health care, including a
paper by Barrilleaux and Brace (2007), note that recent efforts to expand health care have
employed not only traditional government programs but also efforts to utilize marketbased methods. When it comes to the adoption of those programs that encourage taking
advantage of the private market, they may not be championed by liberals, but rather by
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conservatives who see such programs as being good for businesses, particularly small
businesses. This study seeks to evaluate the role of partisanship and ideology in the
adoption of market-based state health programs, controlling for a number of political
independent variables. The model also seeks to control for social and need-based
variables, such as the percentage of citizens in a state without health insurance, the
percentage of minorities in the state, the percentage of small businesses offering coverage
to employees, and the percentage of people in the state who are members of unions.

Literature on the Effects of Ideology and Party Affiliation on Policy Development
Ideology has been found to play a significant role in problem definition and agendasetting (Weissert and Weissert, 2006). Ideology frequently acts as a cue to help
legislators and members of the general public decide the degree to which government
action is necessary and acceptable. A number of researchers note that liberal politicians
would be expected to support reforms in the area of health care involving more
government activity (Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1993 as cited in Barrilleaux and
Brace, 2007). However, the previously cited story of the government-based and marketbased health reforms in Tennessee demonstrate that the relationships between ideology,
party affiliation, and policy development are not always clear. This study seeks to build
upon this literature by investigating the degree to which ideology affects the adoption of
market-based health care expansion programs, utilizing the citizen ideology measure
developed by Berry, et al, (1998).
It should be noted that the literature is mixed in terms of the role of ideology in state
public policy. Some studies do reinforce the idea that state legislators will adopt policies
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based on traditional liberal or conservative ideologies, with more liberal legislators
supporting more liberal public policy and vice versa. Entman (1983) evaluated how the
personal ideologies of legislators in Connecticut and North Carolina affected their rolecall voting. Entman noted that previous research indicated that the impact of ideology is
blunted by the electoral process or socialization of constituents to focus on factors other
than voting records when evaluating incumbents. This research suggests that legislators
may have a certain amount of leeway to incorporate their own preferences into voting
decisions. To investigate the degree to which this is true, Entman used a questionnaire to
gauge where legislators in the two states fit on the “liberal-conservative” continuum.
Constituent ideological preferences are controlled for using district-level measures of
electoral support for Democratic candidates.
The dependent variable for the study was the percentage of times legislators cast
liberal votes (as defined by interest group ratings). In the results for both North Carolina
and Connecticut, legislator ideology was found to have a statistically significant effect.
However, it should be noted that in the case of Connecticut, political party accounted for
much of the variation in roll-call voting. In North Carolina, party accounted for virtually
none of the variance, while ideology accounted for 20-25% of the variance in roll-call
voting. In North Carolina, it was found that more concrete policy beliefs have a greater
impact than philosophical ideology. However, in Connecticut, ideology was more of an
influence than policy stance. Entman found little evidence that constituent attitudes affect
legislator ideology, although ideology seems to largely be a function of party. In regard to
North Carolina, ideology seems to be largely a product of income and urbanization.
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Ultimately Entman concludes that “economic development, party competition, and elite
ideological liberalism seem to reinforce policy decisions” (p. 178).
Barrilleaux and Miller (1988) investigated the link between liberalism and state
Medicaid spending. Ideology was measured in the study using ADA ratings of a states’
congressional delegation. They found that Medicaid spending as a proportion of state
personal income grew by .17% with each percentage increase in liberalism (Barrilleaux
and Miller, 1988, p.1098). Berry and Berry (1992) investigated factors which influenced
adoption of taxes during the twentieth century, including whether or not the state was
controlled by a liberal party. Their analysis did indicate that between 1919 and 1939,
states under complete liberal control with centralized values in other areas were much
more likely to adopt an income tax, as opposed to a state under heavy conservative
control.
Meier and McFarlane (1993) used two different ideology measures, looking at
conservatism and liberalism to investigate the impact of institutional liberalism on
funding for abortion. The authors used the Holbrook (1984) measure of conservatism
(sum of coalition scores) and the New Deal liberalism score created by Rosenstone
(economic liberalism) (1983). Meier and McFarlane hypothesized that more conservative
states would have lower levels of funding for abortion, while more liberal states would
have higher funding levels. New Deal liberalism was found to have a statistically
significant and negative effect on abortion funding at the state level, which provides
evidence that economic liberals are not necessarily sympathetic to the positions of social
liberals on issues like abortion. Grogan (1994) used measures of political culture and
political party control to measure the effect of ideology on state Medicaid spending.
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While Grogan hypothesized that the legislators’ ideological preferences would be
constrained by the size of their constituency and pressure from interest groups, she found
that ideology was statistically significant and negative for all three dimensions of
Medicaid spending (categorical eligibility, financial eligibility, and benefit coverage).
While Grogan initially hypothesized that the ideology measures (which were valued
higher with higher levels of conservatism) would only be significant in the model
examining categorical eligibility, she found that state politicians have more ability to
satisfy their ideological preferences, and revised her model to emphasize the importance
of ideology in all three models.
Brown (1995) investigated the influence of state party control on state welfare
benefits. The study is particularly interested in the role played by coalitions within
political parties, and the relative importance of the different groups making up those
coalitions. In conducting this research, Brown controls for the liberalism of state party
elites using the Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) measure of ideology. Brown
hypothesized that greater party elite liberalism will lead to more generosity in social
welfare benefits. The results of Brown’s pooled cross-sectional (panel) analysis found
that elite liberalism had the expected relationship with social welfare benefits. Welfare
effort was greater in the presence of greater elite liberalism. Shipan and Volden (2006)
hypothesized that liberal governments which are more favorable toward activist policy
will be more likely to enact stricter restrictions on smoking. In their analysis, Shipan and
Volden did find that states with higher levels of liberal ideology are more likely to enact
smoking restrictions.
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It is important to note, however, that a number of studies suggest that ideology is not
always a significant factor in policy adoption. One study conducted by Plotnick and
Winters (1985) sought to combine economic and political models explaining support for
income redistribution. In their model they used two different indicators of liberalism: the
Americans for Democratic Action index and AFL-CIO’s index of House and Senate
voting records. In their analysis, the authors found the link between liberal party control
and redistribution to be insignificant. Plotnick and Winters suggest that this variable’s
influence is only felt through its interaction with other variables.
It should be noted that the variable for institutional ideology included in the previous
study was not found to be statistically significant in three of the analyses, and in the
analyses where the variable did prove to be significant it was not in the hypothesized
direction. The variable for institutional ideology was found to be statistically significant
and positive in regard to mortality per capita and expenditures per patient, which
indicates that a greater level of liberalism in the state legislature actually works in
opposition to the socioeconomic benefits market-based health insurance programs can
create.
In addition to evaluating the role of the ideology of government, studies have also
examined the influence of citizen ideology. The results have been mixed. Some analyses
found that the ideology of the citizenry is not significantly related to state policy
priorities. Jacoby and Schneider (2003) suggest this is because the general public does
not look at different policies as liberal or conservative, thus state governments do not
enact policy based on the ideological nature of the general public. Public opinion is
instead evaluated based on political party affiliation. Appelbaum (2001) used two studies
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to examine two questions regarding decisions on programs to aid the poor. The first
question is to what degree public perception of the deservingness of a group affects
public support for providing aid to the group. The second question is how support for aid
is affected by people’s perception of the level of fault that the needy group bears for their
current position. Political ideology is included as a moderating variable in these two
studies, drawing on prior research which indicated that people with a more conservative
ideology felt the poor were not deserving of help. The results of OLS regression found,
irrespective of whether the recipients were seen as deserving or not, liberals were more
likely to recommend the provision of liberal policies. However, respondents were found
to be more likely to recommend providing liberal policies when the group at issue was
considered more deserving. In the second study, liberals were once again found more
inclined than conservatives to recommend more liberal policies, whether an individual’s
social situation is viewed more as their own individual fault, society’s fault, or the fault
of the culture. Ideology was also strongly connected to the decision not to provide any
benefits, with conservatives much more likely to recommend this than liberals
(Appelbaum, 2001).
Kousser (2002) used the McIver, et al. measure of public ideology to investigate the
effect of the public’s political leanings on state Medicaid spending. Kousser hypothesized
that ideology would not have a significant effect due to lack of public salience. This
hypothesis was confirmed by a cross-sectional regression analysis which did not find a
statistically significant relationship between the ideology measure and Medicaid
spending. Sapat (2004) investigated previous findings that more liberal states enact more
pro-environment regulation using the McIver, et al measure. In Sapat’s probit model, the
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variable for public opinion liberalism was not found to be statistically significant. Sapat
suggests that this is due to the fact that administrative agencies are more insulated from
interest group influence than politicians.
Rudolph and Evans (2005) found that ideology moderates the effect of political trust
on public support for government spending, both in distributive and redistributive
programs. Previous research has suggested that ideology is a powerful influence on
people’s attitudes toward government spending. Based on previous findings, Rudolph and
Evans hypothesized that liberals will be more supportive of increased distributive and
redistributive spending. The authors used Herington’s sacrifice-based theory of political
trust, which argues that political trust is activated when individuals are asked to sacrifice
their own material self-interest or ideological principle for others. To test the effects of
ideology, the researchers use a five point scale, from 1 (very conservative) to 5(very
liberal). The researchers found a statistically significant interaction between political trust
and conservatism, indicating that ideology moderates support for both distributive and
redistributive policies. Political trust failed to increase liberals’ support for distributive
policy, but increased liberals’ support for some redistributive programs (but not others).
The results indicate that political trust is more influential among conservatives as
opposed to liberals. The authors note that the influence of political trust in increasing
support for distributive and redistributive spending is evidence that trust can help to
overcome ideology.
These two significant findings raise a number of issues regarding traditional
hypotheses about ideology and health care. Hays (1996) hypothesized that states with
strong ideological or political support for adoption of a new law will adopt the law in a

94

more comprehensive fashion and those with strong opposition to the law would adopt
less comprehensively, if at all. Traditionally, increasing access to health care has been a
policy priority of liberals, so it was hypothesized in the effectiveness study that a higher
level of liberal ideology would result in improved health care outcomes. However, the
statistical analyses would seem to indicate the opposite, that in fact the presence of
stronger liberal ideology either did not make a difference in the results or worked against
the creation of the hypothesized outcomes. It should be noted that most of the marketbased programs considered in this study became prevalent in the United States following
the failure of the Clinton health plan, when the states had to take greater responsibility for
expanding health care access. Therefore one could argue that information regarding the
effectiveness of these programs has not had sufficient time to disseminate across the
country. However, at least one of the market-based programs under consideration, state
high-risk health insurance pools, has been present in the U.S. since the late 1970’s and
early 1980’s. Therefore, one would presume that this program has been in existence long
enough for states to have gathered sufficient information to evaluate whether or not they
are worth implementing in their own state. If that is the case, there must be other
variables differentiating adopting from non-adopting states. While other variables
measuring political factors and problem severity are included in the analyses, based on
previous adoption research and the findings of the effectiveness study, the adoption study
to follow will be particularly focused on the relationship between partisanship, ideology
and the adoption of both market-based programs in general and high-risk pools
specifically.
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Getting a better sense of the what role ideology plays in both the effectiveness and
adoption of these market-based health expansion efforts stands to improve our
understanding of policy in the U.S. states in a number of ways. Debates over the efficacy
of policy in academic research, the popular media, and in general conversation are
frequently viewed through the prism of conservatism versus liberalism. The debate over
the Obama administration’s health care plan in 2009 often assumed the traditional
narrative of liberals in favor of government intervention on one side and conservative
opponents of such intervention on the other. However, to characterize the Obama plan as
merely a “big government” plan is to ignore the aspects of the plan promoting the
expansion of employer-based insurance and other aspects of the private market.
Similarly, characterizing the market-based programs along liberal versus conservative
lines ignores their ideological complexity, indeed the growing ideological complexity of
American public policy in general. Students of public policy must acknowledge that as
problems such as lack of access to health care have continued to grow, policy makers
have been forced to become less reliant on old policy paradigms and look to new ones
such as governing by network. Rethemeyer and Hatmaker (2007), in their discussion of
policy networks, note that less bureaucratically centralized government grew out of
trends which included a decline in the power of political parties. Examining whether
ideology has a clear influence on the adoption of these market-based health insurance
expansion programs will allow us to get a better sense of what to degree these old
ideological regimes are being broken down.
Along with ideology, party affiliation has been found to be an important factor in
determining people’s views on government-based versus market-based programs.
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Republicans have traditionally opposed government intervention in solving domestic
social problems, preferring that the market be utilized to address such problems.
Democrats on the other hand are much more inclined to distrust the ability of the market
to address problems and reject market-based solutions in favor of government-based
programs (Weissert and Weissert, 2006). Jacoby and Schneider (2003) actually found
that party affiliation was a better predictor of what policies will be enacted in a state, as
the general public does not tend to evaluate policies according to ideology and thus
politicians do not tend to support policies based on where they fit on the traditional
conservative-liberal perspective. Hwang and Gray (1990) examined the role of party
control on education policy and found that Democratic Party control did not have a
significant impact due to the bipartisan nature of education, although the level of voter
participation in the state was found to be significant. To evaluate the influence of party
affiliation on the adoption of market-based programs, this study includes a variable
measuring the percentage of state legislators belonging to the Democratic party. This data
was taken from the U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Abstract.
This chapter of the dissertation will be primarily concerned with the role of party
affiliation (particularly Democratic control of the state legislature) and the level of liberal
ideology held by the state’s population in the adoption of market-based programs.
However, this analysis will also employ a number of covariates to control for other
factors which could have a significant influence on adoption. Control covariates related
to the political character of a state include the level of political competition, the influence
of Southern as opposed to non-Southern states, and the level of lobbyist activity in a state
as it relates to health care. The model also includes covariates to account for the role of
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the need for health expansion programs in the state. These covariates include: the
percentage of small businesses providing coverage to their employees, the percentage of
minorities in a state, the percentage of the state’s population belonging to unions, and a
gross measure of the percentage of a state’s population which is uninsured.

Research Questions
This chapter examines the influence of political and socioeconomic variables on the
adoption of market-based health insurance expansion programs. The primary research
questions at issue in this chapter of the dissertation are:
1. What is the effect of Democratic Party control of the state legislature on the
adoption of market-based health expansion programs?
2. What is the effect of liberal citizen ideology on the adoption of market-based
health expansion programs?
This model will also address questions in regard to the control variables:
3. What is the effect of political competition on the adoption of market-based health
expansion programs?
4. What is the effect of Southern politics on the adoption of market-based health
expansion programs?
5. What is the effect of a stronger lobbyist presence related to health care in a state
on the adoption of market-based health expansion programs?
6. What is the effect of the racial composition of a state on the adoption of marketbased health expansion programs?
7. What is the effect of a higher level of small businesses providing insurance
coverage on the adoption of market-based health expansion programs?
8. What is the effect of the level of union membership on the adoption of marketbased health expansion programs?
9. What is the effect of a higher percentage of uninsured people in a state on the
adoption of market-based health expansion programs?

Research Design
The adoption chapter utilizes a Cox proportional hazard model. This is a form of event
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history analysis, in which we study “how the duration spent in one social state affects the
probability some entity will make a transition to another social state” (Box-Steffensmeier
and Jones, 1997, p. 1414). Box-Steffensmeier and Jones note that hazard modeling is
preferable to regression methods because traditional regression methods fail to
adequately differentiate between states when investigating a process taking place over
time (such as policy adoption). They argue that this is due to the fact that the effect of the
duration between the start point and adoption is not adequately taken into account (BoxSteffensmeier and Jones, 1997).
Event history analysis seeks to do just that, and is proposed as an alternative to crosssectional analysis (which cannot model a process over time) and panel design (which
could provide inaccurate impressions about how a change takes place). The first key
concept in regards to event history analysis is the survivor function, which looks at the
probability that the event of interest has survived beyond the end of the measured time
period (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). In the case of the dissertation study, the
survivor function is examining the probability that a state has not enacted an event by the
end of the time period of interest (1989-2003). The second concept which is important to
event history analysis is the occurrence of the event of interest, in this case the adoption
of one of the market-based health expansion programs. The third key concept in regards
to event history analysis is the hazard rate, which according to Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones (1997) “reflects the rate at which a duration or episode ends in the interval”
considering it did not previously terminate” (p. 1419). Put another way, the hazard rate
reflects the risk of an event occurring given it has not happened already.
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In order, to assess the hazard rate, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) note the
importance of selecting an appropriate starting point. For the purposes of this study, the
starting point selected was 1989, as the 1990’s were a decade of significant state-level
action in the area of health care, spurred in part by the development and defeat of the
Clinton plan (Sparer, 2004). The authors note that it is also very important that the
dependent variable be appropriately formatted. Often the dependent variable is formatted
as a binary variable (0 if a change has not occurred, 1 if it has occurred). The dependent
variable can also be a continuous variable measuring the amount of time that elapses
before a change (Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). The form of event history used in this
analysis, the Cox proportional hazard model, utilizes a binary dependent variable,
however the model is specified with a duration measure to account for the effect of time.
The Cox model is one of several proportional hazard models which seeks to measure
the hazard rate while addressing the issue of time dependency in such a way that it does
not unduly bias the results. According to Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997), the
proportional hazard “refers to the effect of any covariant having a proportional and
constant effect” which is not influenced by time (p. 1433). As time is already accounted
for in the Duration measure, one wants to make sure that the influence of the covariates
included in the model is not also owing to the passage of time. To interpret the hazard
rate for each covariate (as reported by STATA), one subtracts 1 from the hazard rate. For
instance, suppose that STATA reports a hazard rate of .93 for one of the covariates. You
would subtract .93 from 1 to get -.07. This indicates that this covariate decreases the
chance of adoption by approximately 7%. However, if a hazard rate of 1.14 is reported,
you would subtract 1 from this number get .14. This indicates that the covariate increases
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the chance of adoption by approximately 14%. It is important to remember that since the
enactment of a program is the hazard in the analysis, a covariate having a positive
relationship to the dependent variable indicates that the covariate increases the likelihood
of the enactment of market-based state health expansion program. A negative value
indicates a lower probability of adoption.
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) note that the use of models like the Cox
proportional hazard model, which utilizes time-invariant covariates (or covariates whose
influence remains proportional across time), can yield valuable information about the
social world. They note that in interpreting results, one must be mindful that the estimates
for covariates “reflect an underlying longitudinal process” and “reflect how risk increases
or decreases across time” for some units relative to others (p. 1439).

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure showing whether there has been the
adoption of a market-based health expansion program (a coding of “1” will be used to
indicate when an adoption has occurred in that year, a coding of “0” will be used to
indicate when an adoption has not occurred in that year). The data on whether these
programs have been adopted at the state level and what year they were adopted was
reported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’ website State Coverage Initiatives. It
is important to note that this Cox regression analysis is a multiple failure model. This is
necessary as it is theoretically possible that a state could adopt as many as five different
programs during the period of interest. The analyses of the cases are clustered by
adoption, as the adoption process is unique for each state. Thus, for each state, the
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duration variable begins at 0 and counts up 1 for each year that that the state does not
adopt a market-based health expansion variable. When the state does adopt one of the
five market-based health expansion variables, the duration variable was reset at 0. This
process was repeated until the end of the period of study or until the last adoption of a
market-based health expansion program within a state. It should be noted that in the Cox
regression analysis, states were censored from the analysis after the last adoption in the
state. Including cases within a state that did not lead to a failure by the end of the period
of study made no difference to the results of the analysis. To test this, the analysis was
run using these additional cases and the results proved to be the same.
As discussed by Hansford and Spriggs (2006), the Cox proportional regression
analysis has observed and unobserved dependent variables.
The observed dependent variable measures whether an event occurred at a particular
point in time, or put differently, the length of time before an event occurs. The
unobserved dependent variable is the hazard rate, or instantaneous risk that the event
will occur at time t, conditional on the event not having occurred previously. A
hazard rate is essentially analogous to a probability, except that the hazard rate does
not have an upward bound of one (Hansford and Spriggs, 2006).
Thus, in this analysis, as the hazard rate increases the probability of a market-based
health expansion program being adopted increases, and when the hazard rate decreases
the probability of adoption decreases. Interpreting the coefficients, a positive coefficient
indicates a covariate increases the probability of an adoption occurring and a negative
coefficient indicates a decreased probability of an adoption occurring.

Political Variables
Existing literature suggests that programs to expand health care garner more support
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from politically liberal populations, but this support is tempered by public skepticism
(Weissert and Weissert, 2006, p. 325). However, researchers like Barrilleaux and Brace
(2007) note that market-based approaches to expanding health care tend to be favored
more by conservative political forces. This is due to the fact that market-based
approaches still seek to utilize the private insurance market by expanding access, while
liberals tend to be distrustful of the private market. At the same time, conservatives are
opposed to too much government intervention in the marketplace. To test this hypothesis,
this study utilizes the measure of citizen ideology developed by Berry, et al. (1998). This
measure is computed by taking interest group ratings for incumbents in a state legislative
district, interest group ratings for challengers in a state legislative district, and comparing
the election returns for each candidate to create a measure of the ideology of people in the
district. The district level measures are then averaged to create a state-level measure. The
ideology index goes from 0 (very conservative) to 100 (very liberal).
H1: A higher level of citizen liberalism will have a negative relationship to the adoption
of market-based state health expansion programs.
Another variable measures to what degree the legislature of a state is under
Democratic control. This variable is the percentage of Democrats in the state legislature.
Again, Democrats are not expected to be supporters of market-based programs, as the
Democratic Party has historically championed government-based programs such
Medicaid, Medicare, and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (Weissert and
Weissert, 2006). Also, in the past two decades it has been Democratic presidents, Bill
Clinton and now Barack Obama, who have put forth proposals for universal health care.
H2: There will be a negative relationship between Democratic control of the legislature
and the adoption of market-based state health expansion programs.
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Previously cited literature (Bowling and Ferguson, 2001) noted that a state of divided
government can increase the likelihood of adopting health policy. This is due to the fact
that if party control of government is more closely divided between the Democratic and
Republican parties, politicians from both sides will be more active in trying to court
voters, in part through the creation of new programs (Key, 1949). One method of
measuring whether or not a government is divided is the margin between the majority and
minority parties in the legislature. This variable is measured as the difference between the
percentage of seats held by the majority party and the percentage of seats held by the
minority party. The hypothesis in regard to this variable is that a state of divided
government will increase the likelihood for adoption of market-based state health
programs. The data for whether or not a state has divided political control in a given year
is reported by the U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Abstract.
H3: The presence of divided government in the state will have a positive relationship to
the adoption of market-based state health expansion programs.
The fourth political variable included in the analysis takes into account whether or not
the state under consideration is a Southern state. Researchers in the area of political
culture (Elazar, 1966; Johnson, 1976; Morgan and Watson, 1991) all found that the vast
majority of southern states have traditionalistic political cultures which view government
as a “means of maintaining the existing order” (Elazar, 1966 as quoted in Koven and
Mausolff, 2002, p. 69). These traditionalistic states would be most likely to oppose major
government intervention in the private health care market, and thus more likely to support
market-based programs which require less direct government intervention. Also, southern
states have historically been opposed to change enforced by the federal government.
Therefore, one would expect that Southern states would be more likely to adopt market104

based programs to expand health care as an alternative to more top-down, governmentbased programs.
H4: Southern states will be more likely to adopt market-based state health expansion
programs than non-Southern states.
Three additional political covariates included in the analysis examine the role of the
presence of health care-related lobbyists in a state, as previous literature as indicated that
they can have a significant influence on public policy (Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and
McAtee, 2004). The covariates are coded as the percentage of lobbyists in a state which
represent a particular interest related to health care. The three lobbying interests
examined are lobbyists for groups seeking to expand health care, lobbyists representing
the interests of employers in the state, and lobbyists representing the interests of the
insurance companies. While these categories of lobbyists represent divergent interests,
they are all hypothesized to contribute to the adoption of market-based health insurance
expansion programs. Advocates for health care expansion reform would be expected to
support a variety of strategies for expanding coverage, including government-based and
market-based efforts. Lobbyists representing the interests of employers would be
hypothesized to support the adoption of the market-based health insurance reforms
because the majority are designed to either directly or indirectly benefit small employers.
In regard to the insurance industry, most of these reforms seek to expand access to the
private insurance industry in some way, which would have the effect of enlarging their
customer base. Even those programs which establish an alternative mechanism, such as
high-risk pools, are not intended as competition to the insurance industry but as a way to
expand access to insurance with placing expensive mandates on health insurance
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companies. Therefore lobbyists representing the insurance industry would be expected to
support the adoption of market-based programs.
H5: A higher percentage of lobbyists in a state representing the interests of health care
expansion advocates will have a positive relationship with the adoption of market-based
health expansion programs.
H6: A higher percentage of lobbyists in a state representing the interests of employers
will have a positive relationship with the adoption of market-based health expansion
programs.
H7: A higher percentage of lobbyists in a state representing the interests of the insurance
industry will have a positive relationship with the adoption of market-based health
expansion programs.

Need Variables
This study also seeks to account for variables which could affect the need for marketbased incremental health programs. One important social variable which can create a
greater need for health care expansion, according to the literature, is the racial
composition of a state. The literature notes that minorities are more likely to both suffer
from serious health conditions and to lack adequate access to health care (Brown, et al,
2000; Longest, 2006). Therefore, one could hypothesize that states with larger minority
populations would have more need for programs to expand access to health care, and thus
would be more likely to adopt such programs. This study tests this hypothesis by utilizing
a measure of the percentage of minorities (non-white citizens in a state) as reported in the
U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Abstract. It is hypothesized that states with larger
populations of minorities will be more likely to adopt market-based state health
programs.
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H8: A larger minority population will have a positive relationship with the adoption of
market-based state health expansion programs.
Another variable related to need is the percentage of small employers in a state that
provide health insurance benefits to their employees, as reported by the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey. Analysts like Morrissey (2008) have noted the difficulties that
small employers can face when trying to cover their employees, particularly in regard to
affordability. This variable is particularly relevant to the issue of the adoption of marketbased state health expansion programs, as many of these programs are created with the
goal of allowing small businesses or other types of small organizations to provide health
insurance coverage to underserved populations. Uninsured small business employees
could be viewed as a key client population in terms of market-based programs. Thus a
state with a lower percentage of small businesses which provide such coverage would
seem to have greater need of market-based state health expansion programs. This study
hypothesizes that states with a higher percentage of small employers that provide health
insurance coverage to employees will be less likely to adopt market-based state health
programs due to a lower level of need.
H9: A higher level of small employer-provided health care will have a negative
relationship with the adoption of market-based state health expansion programs.
A third variable related to need is the gross level of uninsured people in the state. The
literature has laid out a good case for the myriad of social ills created by lack of insurance
coverage (Davis, et al, 2007; National Academies, 2003; Hadley, 2003; Wolman and
Miller, 2004). While the variable for the percentage of small employers in a state which
provides coverage to their employees is expected to be a better explanatory covariate for
the purposes of this analysis, this study does seek to test the relationship between the
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overall level of uninsured and the adoption of market-based programs. As these programs
are touted as an alternative to the more traditional government-based programs, one could
argue that a higher level of uninsured in a state will encourage adoption of these
programs.
H10: A higher overall level of uninsured in a state will have a positive relationship with
the adoption of market-based state health expansion programs.
A fourth variable examining the need for market-based state health programs is the
percentage of a state’s population that is members of unions. Historically, being a
member of a union has been an important source of health coverage for many Americans
Feldstein, 2007; Morrissey, 2008, p. 11). Thus, the hypothesis in regard to this variable is
that the higher the percentage of unionization in a state, the less likely the state would
have a need for market-based health insurance programs. The data regarding the
percentage of a state’s population that is union members was taken from the U.S. Census
Bureau Statistical Abstract.
H11: A higher level of union membership in a state will have a negative relationship with
the adoption of market-based state health expansion programs.

Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistics for Covariates in the Adoption Study
Median
Mode
Min.
Max.
Skewness
Majority
23.6
n/a
2.7
86.8
1.02
Control
Citizen
44.4
n/a
9.3
72.9
.011
Ideology
Democratic
53
n/a
11
91
.227
Control
Southern
n/a
0
0
1
1.05
States
Minority
17.9
n/a
1.6
56
.763
Population
Small Business 40.8
n/a
29.4
58.7
.384
Unionization
12.6
n/a
2.9
47.2
1.55
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Table 5-2: Hypothesized Relationships between Covariates and Adoption of Market-Based
Programs1
Covariates
Hypothesized Relationship to Adoption of MarketBased Health Programs
Citizen Liberalism
Democratic Control
Divided Government
Southern State
Health Expansion Advocates
+
Employer Advocates
+
Insurance Advocates
+
Minority Population
+
Small Business
+
Union Membership
Percentage Uninsured
+

Reviewing the descriptive statistics for the adoption study, the first group of
covariates measure political factors affecting the adoption of market-based programs.
One variable in this vein, the level of citizen liberalism in a state, was 44.4 (on a range of
0-100). This indicates, similarly to the institutional ideology variable used in the
effectiveness study, that state citizens trended slightly conservative. The minimum level
of citizen ideology in the data set was 9.3 and a maximum value was 72.9. A second
political variable, the percentage of Democrats in the state legislature, had a median of
53%, with a minimum of 11% and a maximum of 91%. The variable measuring the
percentage difference between the majority and minority party in the legislature had a
median of 23.6%, with a minimum of 2.7% and a maximum of 86.8%. The final political
variable in the adoption is the dummy variable representing whether a state is Southern or
non-Southern, which had a mode of 0. Interestingly, all of these variables were positively
skewed to various degrees.
The remaining variables in this analysis focus on socioeconomic factors affecting the
adoption of market-based programs. The first variable in this group, the percentage of
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minority population in a state, had a median of 17.9%, with a minimum of 1.6% and a
maximum of 56%. The second socioeconomic variable, the percentage of small
employers providing coverage to their employees, had a median of 40.8%, indicating that
in general a little less than half of the small employers in a state provide coverage to their
employees. The minimum for this variable was 29.4% and the maximum was 58.7%. The
final variable in this group, the percentage of unionization in state, had a median of
12.6%, with a minimum of 2.9% and a maximum of 47.2%. All of these variables were
positively skewed to various degrees.

Selection of Statistical Software
The analyses for both portions of this dissertation were completed with Intercooled
STATA version 9. This software offered clear benefits to other available software
packages, particularly SPSS. In regard to the Cox proportional hazard model, the STATA
software allows for the use of robust standard errors. The use of these robust standard
errors allows for a more accurate estimation of the true relationship between the
covariates included in the model and the adoption or non-adoption of market-based health
insurance expansion programs. While the option of using the Cox proportional hazard
model is available in SPSS as well, the use of default standard errors is more likely to
produce biased statistical results.

Test for Proportionality/Correlation
The key concern in regard to whether a covariate is appropriate to use in a Cox
proportional hazard regression model is whether or not the effect of the covariate on the
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dependent variable is proportional across time. A key assumption of the Cox model is
that the effect of the covariates does not increase or decrease as the duration increases
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). As duration is already accounted for in the model,
if a covariate’s effect varies across time the results of the model will be biased. Therefore
it is important to conduct a diagnostic to investigate whether there is any evidence that
the effects of the covariates are not proportional. One common diagnostic is to use
Schoenfeld residuals, which can be generated by statistical software packages like
STATA (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).
A statistical test can then be run using these residuals to test the proportional hazard
assumption. Once you have the Schoenfeld residuals, one can censor those cases where a
“failure” (in this case the adoption of a market-based program) did not occur. One can
then create a variable containing the ranked order of survival time (in this case the ranked
order of the “Duration” variable). A test of correlation can then be run between the
ranked order of survival time and the residuals. If any statistically significant correlations
are found that indicates that the proportional hazard assumption is violated (Kim, n.d.).
No statistically significant correlations were found when this analysis was run, indicating
that none of these covariates violate the proportional hazard assumption. The results of
this analysis can be found in Exhibit K of the Appendix.
Correlation tests were also run on the independent variables to determine whether or
not any of them were highly correlated with each other, thereby biasing the analysis.
None of the variables were found to be correlated above the .8 threshold, indicating that
we can be confident that the analysis is not being biased. The results of these bivariate
correlations can be found in Exhibit L of the Appendix. Bivariate regression analyses
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were also run on the covariates in the analysis to further test for endogeneity. These
analyses found that the relationships had adjusted R-squares well below .5, indicating that
endogeneity is not an issue likely to affect the Cox regression analysis. The results of the
bivariate regression analyses can be found in Exhibit M of the Appendix.

Analysis
The table below shows the results of the Cox Proportional Hazard analysis examining the
effect of the covariates of interest on the adoption of market-based health expansion
programs. These results provide support for a number of political and social covariates
being important to the analysis, but also indicate a number are not significant.

Table 5-3: Cox Results for the Model of the Adoption of Market-based Programs (First Version)2
Covariates

Hazard Rate

Z

P>Z

1.01

Robust Standard
Error
.008

Divided
Government
Democratic
Control
Citizen Ideology

1.34

0.18

2.29

.534

3.54

0.000

1.00

.011

0.06

0.95

Southern States

.401

.126

-2.91

0.004

Health Expansion
Advocates
Employer
Advocates
Insurance
Advocates
Small Business

1.17

6.94

0.03

0.98

9.13e+23

2.89e+25

1.74

0.081

5.57e-06

.00008

-0.84

0.400

.965

.029

-1.20

0.232

Minority

1.03

.015

2.24

0.025

Union
Membership
Uninsured

1.00

.028

0.15

0.883

1.01

.060

0.23

0.818

No. of subjects=309
No. of failures=51
Time at risk=1458
Wald Chi-square=39.04
P>0.0001
Log pseudolikelihood=-207.85
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The results of the Cox regression analysis are decidedly mixed. There are a number of
significant covariates, but also a number of covariates demonstrating a low level of
statistical significance and/or substantive significance. It is possible that these variables
demonstrating very low levels of significance are obscuring the significance of other
variables. Therefore, a second, more parsimonious model was run, omitting some of the
lower performing variables. The interest group variables were omitted by from the
second model because all three demonstrated either low statistical significance, low
substantive significance in terms of the hazard ratio, or both. The gross measure of the
percentage uninsured in the state was also omitted from the second analysis as it did not
prove to be statistically significant and it is possible that that the variable is obscuring the
significance of the other covariates, particularly the percentage of small employers in a
state providing health coverage.

Table 5-4: Cox Regression Results for the Adoption of Market-based Health Insurance Programs
Covariates
Hazard Rate
Robust Standard
Z
P>Z
Error
Divided
.999
.007
-0.09
0.93
Government
Democratic
1.07
.013
5.41
0.000
Control
Citizen Ideology
.973
.013
-2.00
0.05
Southern States

.156

.078

-3.71

0.000

Small Business

.956

.018

-2.44

0.02

Minority

1.03

.011

3.06

0.002

Union
1.00
Membership
No. of subjects=309
No. of failures=51
Time at Risk=1458
Wald Chi-Square=43.02
P>.0000
Log pseudolikelihood=-205.17

.027

-0.01

0.993
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Political Variables
The results of the analysis indicate that a greater level of Democratic control of the
legislature increases the probability of market-based health programs being adopted. This
runs counter to the hypothesis that Democrats oppose efforts that depend on the private
health insurance market or market principles. However, there is anecdotal evidence that
Democrats, under certain conditions, do support more market-oriented approaches to
expanding health care, such as tax incentives. This was particularly true in the wake of
the failure of the Clinton health care program. In the absence of a political environment
where there is a strong push for more government-based health care, it has been argued
the Democrats will support whatever policies can gain enough support to pass, which
may include the market-based programs. It is important to note that there is evidence that,
in the aftermath of the Clinton plan, Democrats have become more receptive to tax-based
coverage subsidies, with such ideologically opposed figures as Democrat Lloyd Bentsen
and Republican Dick Armey coming out in favor of tax credits to expand coverage in the
early 21st century. Democratic movement on the issue could be seen somewhat during the
2000 presidential election, with Vice President Al Gore incorporating a small tax credit
proposal in his health care platform (Toner and Stolberg 2002).
In 2001, with the passage of the Bush tax cut and a possible recession approaching,
Democrats were forced to accept that tax credits were their best option for expanding
access to health care. That year, then-Republican senator James Jeffords proposed the
REACH Act, which offered $1000 tax credits for individuals and $2500 tax credits
families to aid them in paying for health insurance coverage. While the REACH Act
failed to get anywhere in Congress, it marked a political breakthrough because Jeffords
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was joined by a number of Democrats in championing the bill. In 2002, Democrats like
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle were critical of the use of tax credits, but their
actual legislative behavior said otherwise (Toner and Stolberg 2002).
In Fiscal Year 2003 the president proposed a budget with a tax credit for the uninsured
worth $89 billion over ten years. Democrats opposed the measure because the credit was
primarily targeted at the individual market and the party was concerned that it would
cause people to leave employer-provided plans. Meanwhile, the Democrats were
successful in inserting a refundable tax credit for workers displaced by trade deals into
the Trade Adjustment Act. A bipartisan proposal was made to use the tax credit for
individual and employer-provided coverage. The president’s budget proposal failed, but a
tax credit was included in the Trade Adjustment Act (Cunningham, 2002).
While there is evidence that Democratic control of the state legislature contributes to
adoption of market-based programs, the covariate for citizen ideology supported the
hypothesis that a higher level of citizen liberalism will stand in opposition to the adoption
of the market-based programs. This supports the contention that states with a more
strongly liberal citizenry are less accepting of these market-based programs, seeing them
as less effective competitors to government-based programs. This finding does highlight
the ideological divide in the Democratic Party. While the Democratic Party is
conventionally associated with liberal policies, the debate over the Obama
administration’s health care plan has highlighted the fact that there is a significant portion
of the Democratic party which has conservative tendencies, particularly in regard to
issues like health care which many people can find threatening. The conflicting findings
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between Democratic control of government and citizen ideology highlight statistically the
policy differences between Democratic politicians and die-hard liberal populations.
Looking at the covariate for the presence of divided government, the finding for this
covariate indicates that the presence of divided government in a state has no statistically
significant effect on the probability of market-based programs being enacted. It was
expected that this kind of program would be more likely to pass under conditions of
divided government, as these programs do combine elements of liberal and
conservative policy. However, the findings indicate that lack of partisan unity in
government did not have a significant effect on the passage of these programs.
The covariate for whether or not a state is a Southern state did not perform as
hypothesized in the analysis. Southern states were expected to be more amenable to the
adoption of market-based health care programs, as they represent an alternative to more
coercive government-based efforts. However, the results indicate that Southern states are
less likely to adopt market-based programs. While this finding deserves closer study, this
finding may stem from the fact that Southern states may view even the market-based
programs as an unacceptable intrusion into the private market. Recall that that while these
programs emphasize the role of the private market and behave according to market
principles, the programs do require some degree of government action. The politicians
and population of Southern states may look negatively upon even limited government
intrusion.

Need Variables
Looking at the covariates related to need, the analysis indicates that the higher the
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percentage of small businesses in a state which provide health insurance benefits to their
employees, the less likely these programs are to be enacted. This supports the hypothesis
that a higher percentage of small employers providing health care benefits to their
employees reduces the need for market-based programs.
The covariate for the percentage of minorities in the state also fits into the hypothesis.
The literature notes the fact that minority populations in the states and the nation as a
whole are both at greater risk for serious medical conditions and often have more
difficulty accessing medical care (Brown, et al, 2000; Longest, 2006). Therefore it was
hypothesized that a higher minority population in a state would have a positive effect on
the adoption of market-based state health expansion efforts. This hypothesis was
supported by the analysis, which did find a positive relationship between the percentage
of minorities in a state and the adoption of market-based programs. This seems to support
the broader idea that the greater the level of need a state faces in regard to access to
health care, the more likely a state will adopt a program to address it. This finding should
be further researched, however, as the literature does suggest that the factors which lead
to a higher uninsured rate among minority populations (notably ability to pay) would
limit the ability of the market-based programs to help.
The final covariate in this model is the percentage of a state’s population which are
union members. This covariate was not found to be statistically significant in the
analysis, suggesting that unions may no longer be the force in the provision of health care
that they once were. This has been suggested by the discussion of the Obama health care
reform being partially funded by taxation of union health care plans, dubbed by some as
“cadillac plans.”
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Discussion of Cox Regression Results
The results of the Cox regression analysis indicate that the adoption of market-based
health expansion programs is politically driven, as well as being influenced by the need
for health expansion programs. The results note an interesting conflict between the
covariate for Democratic control of the state legislature and the level of citizen ideology
in the state. The level of Democratic control of the legislature was found to be significant
and positive in the analysis, while the level of citizen liberalism was found to be
significant and negative. This is a notable finding as conventional wisdom associates the
Democratic party with more liberal policies. Thus it was hypothesized that both of these
variables would have a negative relationship with the adoption of market-based
programs. The fact that the results for both of these covariates were statistically
significant but in the opposite directions indicate that the Democratic Party is not
beholden to liberal ideology. This highlights the fact that there is a significant
conservative wing of the Democratic Party, as was illustrated by the debate over the
health care reform plan proposed by the Obama administration. Conservative Democrats,
particularly those from the southern part of the United States known as “blue dogs,” were
a significant part of the opposition to Obama’s proposal. As President Obama’s proposal
called for, in part, an expansion of publicly provided health care, it had strong support
among the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. This is indicative of how complex and
divisive the health insurance issue can be, as even Democrats, who widely agree that
health insurance should be accessible to all, had difficulty uniting behind a reform plan
proposed by a president of their own party at the time of this writing. However,
Democrats, like their Republican counterparts, also face opposition to universal health
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care from constituents concerned about the effect a major change in the American health
care system will have on their own coverage. Therefore, Democrats as a party are
constrained by their conservative elements, while support for more broad-based health
care reform is strong in highly liberal areas.
However, this explanation of the findings for Democratic control of the legislature and
citizen ideology complicates to some degree the explanation of the covariate for Southern
states. The analysis indicates a statistically significant and negative relationship between
states in the Southern part of the U.S. and the adoption of market-based programs. It was
hypothesized that Southern states, with a more conservative political ideology and an
opposition to government intervention in the marketplace, would be supportive of
market-based health expansion programs. However, while these programs are not purely
market-based and do involve some government action, it is possible that even this more
moderate intervention in the private marketplace is not palatable to populations in the
South. Thus, Democratic support for market-based health expansion programs could be
seen as splitting the difference between the conservative South and more liberal regions.
The significant results of the analysis for the covariates measuring the need for health
expansion programs were as hypothesized. The percentage of small employers providing
coverage to their employees was found to be significant and negative. This supports the
hypothesis that, as market-based programs are designed in a manner to directly or
indirectly benefit small businesses, the higher the percentage of small employers that
already provide coverage to their employees, the less need there is for market-based
programs. Conversely, the higher the percentage of minorities living in a state, the more
likely a state will adopt a market-based program. This supports the hypothesis that, as
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minorities are in greater need of access to health care, states with higher minority
populations will more actively pursue programs with the goal of expanding access to
health care. While these programs are narrower in their impacts as opposed to
government-based programs, states with populations of great need would be expected to
pursue a variety of options. The covariate for the percentage of unionized people in a
state was not found to be statistically significant, suggesting that need as it relates to
market-based programs should be measured in more targeted ways.
The findings of this analysis indicate that Democrats are supportive of market-based
programs, which can be viewed as conservative in nature and do not enjoy a great deal of
support among liberal constituencies. While this support among Democrats may be due
to the fact that these programs are seen as effective, it may also be due to the fact that
Democrats recognize the need to expand access to health care and often face difficulty in
getting broader, more government-based programs adopted. Thus Democrats may
gravitate toward more pragmatic solutions which can be passed and allow them to claim a
political victory. However, the relationship between party affiliation and ideological
policy preferences is deserving of further study, particularly in terms of the moderating
effects of the need for a policy.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION OF THE ADOPTION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MARKET-BASED
PROGRAMS
The overall purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the effectiveness of marketbased approaches in expanding access to health care, as well as what factors contribute
(or stand in opposition to) the adoption of these programs at the state level. In this
chapter, the results of the market-based effectiveness and adoption analyses are discussed
in regard to how they relate to each other, and what these results say about the nature of
these programs and suggest about the future of American health policy.
It would seem that the five market-based health expansion programs at issue in this
dissertation, taken as a whole, were successful in helping to bring about positive
developmental effects for the U.S. states, despite their often narrow focus. The programs
contributed to reducing mortality per capita, boosting gross state product, and bringing
down the level of emergency outpatients treated per capita. The adoption study sought to
determine whether or not partisan affiliation and ideology could explain the limited
adoption of these market-based health expansion efforts across the U.S. The results of
this study indicates that a higher percentage of Democrats in the state legislature was
positively related with the adoption of market-based programs, but the level of citizen
ideology in the state was negatively related to the adoption of these programs. In terms of
the control covariates, Southern states and the percentage of small businesses providing
health care to their employees were negatively related with the adoption of market-based
programs, and the presence of a higher percentage of minorities in a state is positively
related with the adoption of these programs. Taken together, these findings suggest
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Democrats pursue more centrist approaches to expanding access to health care due to a
higher level of need in the state, and these programs actually do provide general
socioeconomic benefits for the people of a state.
If these market-based expansion programs are in fact effective in delivering general
societal benefits for the people of a state, that then raises the policy issue of whether
government should pursue health care expansion through these market-based programs or
through government-based programs. While this study does not seek to systematically
compare the effectiveness of market-based as opposed to government-based health care
programs, there is anecdotal evidence at the state level which suggests that efforts to take
a more government-based approach to expand health care have ultimately resulted in the
government retreating to more incremental, market-based programs. One recent example
comes from the state of Tennessee, which implemented a government-based, universal
health care program in the wake of the Clinton health care plan which proved financially
and politically unsustainable and was eventually replaced by a market-based program,
which promoted the expansion of employer-offered coverage and established a state
high-risk health insurance pool. In the following section, the example of TennCare and
Cover Tennessee is explored and suggests that, at the state level, market-based efforts
will ultimately prove more effective because they can enjoy more longevity.

Government versus Market-based Health Care Expansion: TennCare and Cover
Tennessee
The findings regarding the analysis of the effectiveness and adoption of market-based
programs are supported anecdotally by Tennessee’s experience with TennCare and the
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Cover Tennessee programs. This example illustrates how a Democratic gubernatorial
administration sought to expand access to health care through a government-based
program in the wake of the Clinton program’s failure, and how that program was
eventually replaced with a narrower, more market-based collection of programs by
another Democratic governor. The example of TennCare and Cover Tennessee also
illustrates that in the face of political pressure, Democratic politicians will pursue more
moderate policy options as opposed to continuing liberal programs initiated by their
predecessor.
Since the advent of the Obama administration, there has been a perception that the
U.S. is again moving toward developing a national health care program for the first time
since the Clinton plan in 1993. In the last few years, a number of states have implemented
or considered implementing some form of universal health care. This might lead one to
wonder if the market-based programs examined in this analysis are really policy solutions
in their own right, or stopgaps until such universal coverage can be achieved. At the state
level, the Tennessee example indicates that states may lack the political and economic
stability to sustain government-based universal health care in the long term, making
market-based initiatives a good alternative solution. It is also illustrative of the idea that
Democratic politicians may pursue liberal policies at a time where the base is greatly
energized, but will pursue more pragmatic solutions when such programs become
politically and fiscally unsustainable. These are issues deserving of more in-depth study.

Discussion
The example of the TennCare/Cover Tennessee program is instructive as it illustrates
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how a Democratic state set out on a path to enact a more progressive, government-based
initiative, and pursued a market-based alternative when that program proved
unsustainable. It also illustrates how the Cover Tennessee program was quickly attacked
for not succeeding according to rather narrow criteria for effectiveness, such as not
meeting enrollment targets or having limited payouts. However, as was noted in the
discussion of previous evaluations of market-based initiatives, if previous researchers
were correct in their proposition that market-based programs can have developmental
benefits, for a state to really gauge whether these market-based programs are effective
one must evaluate them more broadly.
The Tennessee experience also suggests that a lack of political stability or support at
the state level will make any effort at long-term universal health care policy difficult to
sustain. While it may be feasible to enact universal health care at the national level
because of the broader base of political support and greater stability, the example of
TennCare suggests that a universal, government-based model at the state level will be
very difficult to preserve. However, as noted in the previous literature, the problem of
uninsurance takes a serious toll at the state level, and state legislators can ill afford not to
take action. Therefore, an alternative to a universal model may be more incremental,
market-based reforms. While these programs may not have the numbers in terms of
enrollment or benefits that programs such as TennCare might have, the preceding
statistical evidence suggests that taken as a whole they may be able to deliver indirect
developmental benefits to the people of a state that may go unaccounted for.
The policy debate regarding government-based versus market-based health care is
unlikely to be resolved in the near future. What the preceding research suggests is that the
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market-based health expansion programs do present a meaningful alternative to
government-based programs in terms of providing general societal benefits to the people
of the implementing states.
The example of TennCare and Cover Tennessee as well as the results of the previous
analysis of the adoption of these market-based programs, highlights the fact that the
market-based health expansion programs fit into a new policy paradigm wherein
government seeks to address social problems by utilizing the private sector and non-profit
organizations, one example of which is governing by network. Such programs may allow
Democrats who may not be able to sell their constituents on liberal, government-based
programs to still take action on the health care issue. There is a substantial body of
literature on the role of ideology in state policy which indicates that ideology has long
had an inconsistent influence of the enactment of policy (Entman, 1983; Barrilleaux and
Miller, 1988; Berry and Berry, 1992; Meier and McFarlane, 1993; Grogan, 1994; Brown,
1995; Shipan and Volden, 2006; Plotnick and Winters, 1985; Jacoby and Schneider,
2003; Appelbaum, 2001; Kousser, 2002; Sapat, 2004; Rudolph and Evans, 2005; Hays,
1996). A higher presence of conservatism or liberalism in a state legislature or general
population did not always lead to the policy enactments or outcomes hypothesized, as
politicians can be constrained by the values of their constituency. This was borne out by
the analyses in Chapters Two and Four.
The need for more pragmatic solutions to social problems could explain the
gravitation toward more market-oriented policy models, such as governing by network, a
concept which was co-developed by Stephen Goldsmith, a former Republican mayor of
Indianapolis (Eggers, 1993). High-risk pools, a market-based program which has been

125

prominent in this dissertation and which was implemented as part of the Cover Tennessee
program, fits well into this paradigm.
These programs have aspects which are appealing to both conservatives and liberals.
Its conservative appeal stems from the fact that the pools largely do not require an
extensive state bureaucracy, a significant utilization of state funds, or an undue
government intervention into the private market. Rather than taking high-risk individuals
entirely out of the private insurance market, these programs are creating a system wherein
these individuals can receive the coverage they need without the insurance companies
being forced to accept undue financial risk. From a liberal perspective, high-risk pools
still represent a government effort to help those who are in dire need of coverage but have
been denied it. This cross-ideological appeal may account for why high-risk pools have
diffused among traditionalist states like Texas (government represents “a means of
maintaining the existing order”), moralist states like California (“government is
considered a legitimate instrument for promoting social welfare”), and individualistic
states like Illinois (“government was instituted for strictly utilitarian reasons to handle
functions demanded by the people it served”) (Elazar, 1966 as quoted in Koven and
Mausolff, 2002, p. 69). This diverse appeal is suggested by the findings of the adoption
analysis in Chapter Four, which indicate that market-based health expansion programs
are more likely to be found in states with a higher percentage of Democrats in the
legislature, as well as in states with a higher minority population.
This dissertation finds evidence through the study of market-based program
effectiveness that these programs can actually produce some of the general
developmental effects suggested by previous researchers (Barrilleaux and Brace, 2007),
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including reducing mortality per capita, increasing gross state product, and reducing
reliance on emergency room care. If the results of the effectiveness analysis hold true, it
would explain why these programs would be adopted in the presence of a more strongly
Democratic state legislature, despite a lack of support among liberal citizens. The
findings of the adoption study in Chapter Four suggest that the market-based health
expansion programs do not fit into the traditional liberal-driven policy paradigm. Perhaps
more importantly, this dissertation indicates that these programs can have significant
cumulative benefits for the state, despite the fact that individually these programs are
small in scale. More research should be done to examine the nexus between the
effectiveness of these market-based programs and their adoption, to determine to what
degree the effectiveness of these programs is driving their support among conservative
and liberal politicians alike.

Next Steps
Additional research should attempt to compare the effectiveness of market-based
programs and government-based programs. As noted in Chapter Two, evaluations of
health care expansion programs, both market-based and government-based, have been
narrowly focused on outputs such as client enrollment, with little attention given to the
general socioeconomic impacts. More research should be done in terms of the general
effects of both the government-based and market-based programs so that a meaningful
comparison can be made.
Future analyses of the effectiveness of market-based reforms should include additional
variables to take into account the unique characteristics of a state’s health insurance
market. These characteristics, particular to each state, may influence the degree to which
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the market-based programs affect the dependent variables. Future research should also
better parse out the unique characteristics of a state’s population and of the market-based
programs themselves. Each state has unique social and economic characteristics which
could affect the levels of the dependent variables and the degree to which the marketbased health expansion programs can provide aid to that population.
Also, each type of market-based program is unique, with important differences among
programs. This was addressed to a certain extent in the effectiveness analysis of the highrisk pools, which took into account the different levels of accessibility in terms of cost.
Future research should build on this by taking into account differences among limited
benefit plans, reinsurance programs, group purchasing arrangements, the HIFA waivers,
and the high-risk pools. Research growing out of this dissertation should also go more in
depth into identifying and analyzing the channels through which market-based programs
can exert their effects on a state population. The effectiveness study tried to identify
independent control variables which would capture this, but more specific controls could
be utilized in future research.
Continuing this research could expand our understanding of the true benefits we attain
from pursuing policies in areas like the expansion of health insurance coverage, whether
through a government program or a market-based initiative. Often the benefits of these
programs are discussed in terms of enrollment or cost savings to the state. Many argue
that society in general wins if more people have access to services like health care, but it
has not been a well-studied topic in the social sciences. Establishing in a comprehensive
and quantitative manner that helping the uninsured to receive coverage truly does benefit
everyone could reduce societal resistance to such efforts. Also, demonstrating that these
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general benefits for society can be created through programs that utilize the market as
well as government programs could help to weaken the sort of ideological entrenchment
that was seen in the 2009 health care debate. This research is applicable to other areas of
social policy as well, and research of this kind should be used to exam the effects of
programs administered by non-profit and for-profit organizations in areas like education,
job placement, and the environment.
What the preceding research can contribute to the conversation regarding health care
in America is that there is some evidence that these market-based programs, while limited
in scale and incremental, can have meaningful effects. One inference you can draw from
this is that the uninsured is a population composed of many segments of the American
public, each facing unique issues and challenges. Any plan to provide health care
universally must recognize this fact, otherwise some segment of the uninsured could still
slip through cracks in the system.
In conclusion, the experience of the American health care system since 1993 suggests
that it is moving toward a hybrid of publicly and privately provided health care. Based on
current data, lack of access to health care remains a serious and growing problem in the
U.S., and is having wider societal and economic impacts for the country. By that same
token, there is some evidence that even smaller-scale, market-based health expansion
efforts, taken as a whole, positively affect some of these outcomes. The results of the
preceding research also suggest that the adoption of these programs are supported by
Democratic lawmakers, indicating that there is support for market-based health access
expansion efforts from those who traditionally would champion more government-based
solutions.
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As was exhibited in the health reform debate of 2009, there is a regrettable lack of
common ground in terms of how to expand access to health care in a politically charged
environment. However, the debate will never be able to move beyond partisan conflict
until we truly understand what programs, government-based and market-based, truly aid
the uninsured and what costs or benefits these programs hold for society as a whole. This
dissertation will hopefully serve as a small first step in moving that research agenda
forward. In the meantime, in the absence of the implementation of universal health care at
the national level, policymakers, including Democrats, will continue to promote more
incremental, market-based efforts, even though more liberal groups continue to champion
government-based efforts. Further research should be done to build upon the evidence
that these programs, in the aggregate, do provide positive developmental effects for a
state, such improving health, as improving economic productivity, and relieving the
pressure on hospital emergency rooms.

130

APPENDIX
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Exhibit A
Market-based Health Insurance Programs and the States Which Adopted
Them Prior to 2003
Reinsurance
Programs

Limited
Benefit
Plans

Group
Purchasing
Arrangements

Arizona
Idaho
Massachusetts
New Mexico
New York

Arkansas
Colorado
Florida
Minnesota
Montana
New Jersey
North
Dakota
Utah

Arkansas
California
Kansas
New York
Ohio
Texas
West Virginia
Wisconsin

Health
Insurance
Flexibility and
Accountability
Waivers
Arizona
California
Colorado
Illinois
Maine
New Jersey
New Mexico
Oregon
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High-Risk Pools

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Mexico
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Exhibit B
Variables, Sources, Coding and Level of Measurement for the Independent and
Dependent Variables in the Study of the Effectiveness of State Market-Based Health
Insurance Programs
Independent Variables

Data Source

Market-based Health
Index

The Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation State Coverage
Initiatives web site

Index of State HighRisk Health Insurance
Pools

The Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation State Coverage
Initiatives web site

SCHIP/Medicaid 1115
waivers

The Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation State Coverage
Initiatives web site

Institutional Ideology

Web Site of Dr. Richard
Fording, University of
Kentucky

Percentage of Uninsured
in a State

U.S. Census Bureau Statistical
Abstract

Percentage of a State’s
Population in Poverty

U.S. Census Bureau Statistical
Abstract

Percentage of a State
Population that is
Unemployed
Hospital Beds Per
Capita

U.S. Census Bureau Statistical
Abstract

State Employees Per
Capita

The Book of the States

Percentage of a State’s
Population Belonging to
Unions

U.S. Census Bureau Statistical
Abstract

Percentage of a State
Composed of
Metropolitan Areas

U.S. Census Bureau Statistical
Abstract

American Hospital Association
Statistical Abstracts

Description
Additive index of how many of
the market-based health
expansion programs have been
implemented in the state. Ranges
from 0 to 5.
Index measuring the presence and
affordability of high-risk pools in
a state. Ranges from 0 (absence
of a pool) to 5 (pool operates and
offers coverage at 150% of
average market rate).
Ordinal variables indicating the
presence or absence of the
SCHIP program and Medicaid
1115 waivers in a state
(0=absence of programs,
1=presence).
Index of the level of liberalism of
the legislature in a state
(0=highly conservative,
100=highly liberal).
Percentage of a state’s total
population which does not have
health insurance in a given year
Percentage of a state’s total
population living below the
federal poverty level in a given
year
Percentage of a state’s total
population that is without
employment in a given year
Total number of hospital beds in
a state divided by the total state
population
Total number of people in a state
employed by the state
government divided by the
population
Total number of people in a state
belonging to a labor union
divided by the total state
population
Total square miles of area in a
state constituting a metropolitan
area divided by the total number
of square miles in a state
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Level of
Measurement
Ordinal

Ordinal

Ordinal

Interval

Ratio

Ratio

Ratio

Ratio

Ratio

Ratio

Ratio

Exhibit B, cont’d.
Percentage of State Spending
Devoted to Health Care

U.S. Census Bureau Statistical
Abstract

Mortality Per Capita

U.S. Census Bureau Statistical
Abstract

Gross State Product Per Capita

U.S. Census Bureau Statistical
Abstract

Emergency Outpatients
Treated Per Capita

American Hospital Association
Hospital Statistics

Expenditures Per Patient

American Hospital Association
Hospital Statistics
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Total amount of state general
revenue spent on health carerelated items divided by total
state revenue spent for a given
year.
Total number of deaths in a
state divided by the population
of a state for a given year.
Total value of goods and
services produced in a state
divided by the population of
the state for a given year.
Total number of outpatients
treated in a state’s hospital
emergency rooms divided by a
state’s population for a given
year.
Total amount spent on the
treatment of patients in
hospitals divided by the
number of patients treated in
hospitals in the state for a
given year.

Ratio

Ratio

Ratio

Ratio

Ratio

Exhibit C
Test for Outliers/Heteroskedasticity in Study of the Effectiveness of
Market-based Health Insurance Reforms
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of SpendLag
chi2(1) = 32.08
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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Exhibit D
Tests for Normality and Linearity in Study of Effectiveness of
Market-based Health Insurance Programs

0

.05

Density
.1

.15

.2

Test for Normality of Residuals

-10

-5

0
Residuals

5

Kernel density estimate
Normal density
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Exhibit E

-10

-5

Residuals
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Test for Linearity
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10

15
Poverty

20

25

0
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Residuals

5
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Exhibit E, cont’d.
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Exhibit F
Test for Autocorrelation in the Study of the Effectiveness of
Market-based Health Insurance Programs
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
F( 1,
49) = 1.821
Prob > F = 0.1834
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Exhibit G
Test of Correlations for the Study of the Effectiveness of Market-based
Health Insurance Programs
Marketbased
Programs
1.00

Mortality

-0.13

1.00

State Spending

0.14

0.15

1.00

Poverty

0.28

0.26

0.42

1.00

Unemployment

0.16

-0.10

0.17

0.38

1.00

Uninsured

0.31

-0.12

0.29

0.63

0.45

1.00

Emergency
Patients
M1115

-0.20

0.59

0.23

0.30

0.15

-0.03

0.004

-0.02

-0.17

-0.07

-0.03

-0.16

Institutional
Ideology
Expenditures
Per Patient
Gross State
Product
Unionization

-0.20

0.05

0.01

-0.04

0.07

-0.03

-0.064

0.47

-0.07

-0.03

-0.05

-0.34

0.11

-0.09

0.12

0.10

0.23

0.25

-0.15

-0.11

-0.20

-0.31

0.11

-0.29

State
Employees Per
Capita
SCHIP

-0.03

-0.35

-0.03

0.005

0.06

-0.06

0.19

0.006

-0.01

0.02

0.01

0.03

Beds per
Capita
Metropolitan

-0.06

0.53

0.08

0.24

-0.20

-0.16

-0.05

-0.10

0.02

-0.24

0.09

0.03

High-Risk
Health
Insurance
Index

------------

-0.07

0.26

0.08

0.02

0.04

Market-based
Programs
Mortality

State
Spending
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Poverty

Unemployment

Uninsured

Exhibit G, cont’d.
Emergency
Patients

M1115

Institutional
Ideology

Expenditures
Per Patient

Gross State
Product

Unionization

Market-based
Programs
Mortality
State Spending
Poverty
Unemployment
Uninsured
Emergency
Patients
M1115

1.00
-0.05

1.00

Institutional
Ideology
Expenditures
Per Patient
Gross State
Product
Unionization

0.15

0.36

1.00

0.39

0.12

0.11

1.00

-0.07

-0.02

0.06

0.20

1.00

-0.13

0.19

0.16

0.24

0.22

1.00

State
Employees Per
Capita
SCHIP

-0.19

0.18

0.14

-0.14

-0.48

0.09

0.003

-0.03

0.010

0.23

0.07

-0.18

Beds per
Capita
Metropolitan

0.26

-0.18

-0.28

0.36

-0.19

-0.15

-0.14

0.14

0.18

0.19

0.56

0.29

High-Risk
Health
Insurance
Index

-0.14

-0.08

-0.21

-0.21

-0.22

-0.04
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Exhibit G, cont’d.
State
Employment
per Capita

SCHIP

Beds per
Capita

Metropolitan

High-Risk
Health
Insurance
Index

Market-based
Programs
Mortality
State Spending
Poverty
Unemployment
Uninsured
Emergency
Patients
M1115
Institutional
Ideology
Expenditures
Per Patient
Gross State
Product
Unionization
State
Employees Per
Capita
SCHIP

1.00

-0.04

1.00

Beds per
Capita
Metropolitan

0.001

-0.15

1.00

-0.35

0.02

-0.53

1.00

High-Risk
Health
Insurance
Index

0.13

-0.03

-0.20

-0.28
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1.00

Exhibit H
Bivariate Regressions to Test for Correlations of Variables in the
Effectiveness Study with High Bivariate Correlations
Dependent
Variables
Poverty

Poverty

Uninsured

-----------------

Uninsured

Prob>F=0.000
R-sq=0.40
Prob>F=0.002
R-sq=0.02
Prob>F=0.000
R-sq=0.07

Prob>F=.000;
R-sq=0.40
----------------

Beds per
Capita
Mortality

Prob>F=0.000
R-sq=0.05
Prob>F=0.004
R-sq=0.02
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Beds per
Capita
Prob>F=0.000
R-sq=0.03
Prob>F=0.000
R-sq=0.02
----------------Prob>F=0.081
R sq=0.009

Mortality
Prob>F=0.000
R-sq=0.07
Prob>F=0.01
R-sq=0.01
Prob>F=0.10
----------------

Exhibit I
Variables, Sources, Coding and Level of Measurement for the
Independent Variables in the Study of the Adoption of State
Market-based Health Insurance Programs
Covariates

Source

Description

Majority
Control of the
Legislature
Democratic
Control
of the
Legislature
Citizen
Ideology

U.S. Census
Bureau Statistical
Abstract
U.S. Census
Bureau Statistical
Abstract

Percentage difference between the
majority party in the state legislature and
the minority party in the state legislature.
Percentage of seats in the state
legislature held by Democrats.

Web Site of Dr.
Richard Fording,
University of
Kentucky
Medical
Expenditures
Panel Survey
(multiple years)

Index of the liberalism of the general
population of a state
(0=highly conservative; 100=highly
liberal)
Percentage of the total small businesses
(less than 50 employees) that provide
insurance coverage to their employees.

Interval

U.S. Census
Bureau Statistical
Abstract
U.S. Census
Bureau Statistical
Abstract

Percentage of the total citizens in a state
that are non-white.

Ratio

Percentage of a state’s population that
belong to labor unions.

Ratio

U.S. Census
Bureau Statistical
Abstract

Dummy variable indicating whether a
state is Southern or non-Southern state.

Ordinal
(dummy
variable)

Percentage of
Small
Businesses
Offering
Insurance
Percentage of
Minorities in
the State
Percentage of
a State’s
Population that
are Members
of Unions
Southern
States
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Level of
Measurement
Interval

Interval

Ratio

Exhibit J
Correlation between Rank of Duration and Schoenfeld Residuals
(Test of Proportionality Assumption)
Covariate
Pearson
Corr.
Sig.

Southern
States
.076

Minority
Population
.275

Small
Business
-.074

Union
Population
-.059

Citizen
Ideology
-.067

Democratic
Control
.318

Majority
Control
.033

.358

.092

.362

.389

.375

.061

.437
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Exhibit K
Bivariate Correlations Between Covariates in the
Cox Regression Model of Adoption

Southern States
Minority
Population
Small Business
Union
Population
Citizen
Ideology
Democratic
Control
Majority
Control

Southern
States
1 (.000)

Minority
Population
.172 (.002)

.172
(.002)
-.471
(.000)
-.190
(.001)
-.372
(.000)
.591
(.000)
.401
(.000)

1 (.000)
-.376 (.000)
-.131 (.013)
-.361 (.000)
.264 (.000)
-.045 (.221)

Small
Business
-.471
(.000)
-.376
(.000)
1 (.000)
.281
(.000)
.336
(.000)
-.365
(.000)
-.376
(.000)

Union
Population
-.190
(.001)
-.131
(.013)
.281
(.000)
1 (.000)
.562
(.000)
.174
(.000)
-.131
(.013)
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Citizen
Ideology
-.372 (.000)
-.361 (.000)

Democratic
Control
.591
(.000)
.264 (.000)

.336 (.000)

-.365 (.000)

.562 (.000)

.174 (.000)

1 (.000)

.077 (.094)

.077(.094)

1 (.000)

-.361 (.000)

.294 (.000)

Majority
Control
.401
(.000)
-.045
(.221)
-.376
(.000)
-.131
(.013)
-.361
(.000)
.294
(.000)
1 (.000)

Exhibit L
Bivariate Regression Results for the Relationships Between Covariates in
in the Cox Regression Model of Adoption
(Adjusted R-Squares and Significance)
Southern
States

Southern
States
Minority
Population
Small
Business
Union
Population
Citizen
Ideology
Democratic
Control
Majority
Control

.026
(.003)
.219
(.000)
.033
(.001)
.135
(.000)
.347
(.000)
.158
(.000)

Minority
Population

Small
Business

Union
Population

Citizen
Ideology

Democratic
Control

Majority
Control

.026
(.003)

.219
(.000)
.02
(.009)

.033 (.001)

.135
(.000)
.005
(.116)
.11
(.000)
.314
(.000)

.347
(.000)
.066
(.000)
.13 (.000)

.158 (.000)

.02 (.009)
.017
(.014)
.005
(.116)
.066
(.000)
.001(.442)

.017 (.014)
.076 (.000)

.076
(.000)
.11
(.000)
.13
(.000)
.138
(.000)

.314 (.000)
.027 (.003)
.014 (.025)
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.003
(.118)
.128
(.000)

.027
(.003)
.003
(.118)

-.001 (.442)
.138 (.000)
.014 (.025)
.128 (.000)
.083 (.000)

.083
(.000)
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